

JPRS-EER-89-034
30 MARCH 1989



**FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE**

JPRS Report

East Europe

East Europe

JPRS-EER-89-034

CONTENTS

30 MARCH 1989

POLITICAL

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

- Political Reform Still Resisted by Jakes Regime [*FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE* 22 Feb] 1
Progress of Construction of Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Dam on Danube
[*DOKUMENTACNI PREHLED* No 1, 89] 2
Spoken-Language Deterioration in Last 40 Years Noted [*TVORBA* 25 Jan] 4

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

- FRG Weekly Interviews Author on SED Reform [*Hamburg DER SPIEGEL* 6 Feb] 6

HUNGARY

- Talks Held With Austrian Socialists on Convergence [*PROFIL* 30 Jan] 11
Nyers: Socialism Not Prerequisite for Political Role [*PROFIL* 30 Jan] 12
DIE WELT Reports Atrocities at False Border [*DIE WELT* 25 Jan] 14

ECONOMIC

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

- Direct CSSR-USSR Industrial Relations Discussed [*MODERNI RIZENI* Dec] 17
JZD AK Slusovice Sponsors 'Family Enterprises' [*NASE CESTA* 21 Dec] 19

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

- Forests Increasingly Damaged by Pollution [*Bonn INFORMATIONEN* 23 Dec] 20

HUNGARY

- Public Satisfaction With Social Services Analyzed [*MAGYAR NEMZET* 20 Dec] 21

SOCIAL

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

- Demographic Study Views Policy Aimed at Higher Birthrate
[*WIRTSCHAFTSWISSENSCHAFT* Jan] 24

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Political Reform Still Resisted by Jakes Regime

23000110 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE in German 22 Feb 89 p 12

[Article by Viktor Meier]

[Text] The Hungarian popular uprising in 1956 was crushed with bloodshed. Then terror prevailed in Hungary for a few years. Politically "normalization" was marked by a "centrist," moderate reformist course. In 1968 no shooting occurred in Czechoslovakia and repression remained within certain bounds, but politically a reactionary-dogmatic "normalization" took place. This corresponded to the difference between Khrushchev and Brezhnev. In Prague the rulers had to put up with the question whether they did not display, without being forced to do so, an "excess" of reactionary-dogmatic views when they blocked all reforms, even economic ones, and degraded 500,000 people and pushed them to the edge of society. Experts say that, with reforms, Czechoslovakia could have caught up with the world economy in the sixties but now it has missed the chance.

The responsibility with which the representatives of the Husak/Bilak regime have saddled themselves is heavy and the day is near when the nation will demand an explanation from them. Since the demonstrations to commemorate Jan Palach in mid-January the political atmosphere in Czechoslovakia has changed. This does not mean any improvement for a regime that is insecure and disunited tends to react violently and irrationally. The trials against Havel and his friends, but also the increased penalties for "disturbing public order" and for "illegal publications," in the opinion of friends of reform in Prague, are only the beginning of a desperate "bunker struggle" of the dogmatists. Moreover the increased penalties were adopted by the presidium of parliament, headed by Indra, and were not submitted to the plenary session.

Since the election of Jakes as the party's general secretary the Prague leadership has been pursuing a course of elastic resistance to Gorbachev. The majority of the leadership recognizes that economic reforms are necessary and that it would be politically dangerous to openly oppose Gorbachev after preaching for decades the slogan: "With the Soviet Union forever and never anything else." But the leadership believes it has fulfilled its quota of reforms with the laws adopted on the reorganization of the enterprises even though the most important economic policy questions, such as setting of prices, thus far have not been touched and supply difficulties are growing. The regime has turned a deaf ear to political reform. It offers a new edition of the so-called National Front, which, however, is no longer taken seriously by anyone after the present leadership had frustrated the attempts to revive this institution undertaken in 1968.

At the moment, the movement in the system is limited to the personnel conditions in the leadership. Here the rifts that had long been papered over have opened up. Premier Strougal tendered his resignation last September on account of the differences with Jakes, which date back to the power struggle over the office of party leader which had been lost by Strougal. Strougal was disappointed because he saw no possibility of making reform ideas palatable to the leadership. Since Strougal's resignation weakened the "lobby" for reforms, for the sake of "balance" a head had to roll on the other side, too. In December this caused the departure of Bilak, who had controlled foreign policy and ideology along dogmatic lines for almost two decades. Bilak's departure, as is known now, was not the "honorable retirement" that it appeared to be to the outside, but a forced retirement which Bilak fiercely resisted. He is alleged to have said he wanted to remain in office "for a few more months." Some in the leadership assumed that he did this on account of the amount of his pension but then it is said to have come to light that Bilak apparently counted on Gorbachev's early overthrow.

It is characteristic of the political confusion of the Czechoslovak leadership that, on the one hand, there is talk of Strougal's possible return to a high party office while, on the other hand, Bilak comes from his country place to Prague every week, meets there with his followers and promises them that he will "come back" and will bring back his friends into offices. In the party presidium a group of younger people is starting to form, which is identified with the names of former Czech party chief Urbanek, the Slovak Knotek, but also of the Prague city secretary Stepan and labor union chief Zavadiil. This should include also the former Slovak party chief Lenart whose energy is, however, limited and for this reason he is known in Bratislava by the nickname of "Joseph the Lazy." In the meantime he does enjoy a certain moral reputation and it is not out of the question that he will take over the office of president of the republic from the aged Husak. All the younger functionaries have not left much of a mark as yet with the exception of Stepan, whose "distinction," to start with, has, of course, gone in the negative direction on account of the police actions at Wenzeslas Square.

For the moment the political key positions continue to be held by the "dogmatic block," in other words the people around Central Committee Secretary Fojtik, responsible for ideology, the old Stalinist Hoffmann, the president of the parliament, Indra, and probably also General Secretary Jakes, who also controls the security organizations and, despite a degree of caution, is to be counted among the dogmatists and the firm core of the "normalization crew" of 1969. In this "block," fear and insecurity are great because these people are exposed to pressure not only internally but also to pressure from Moscow. When they look around in the neighborhood, they must be worried even more in view of the events in Poland and Hungary. They reach out to Bucharest and East Berlin and hope for Gorbachev's overthrow. Fojtik

has put all his eggs in one basket and wants to wait in the "bunker" for the "change" in world communism. He favored the ruthless employment of police against dissidents. He drafted the intransigent letter answering Cardinal Tomasek in the name of Premier Adamec who is more inclined towards the moderate forces but stands pretty much alone. He opposes any criticism from Gorbachev adviser Yakovlev. Fojtik's wife, Eva Fojtikova, the director of the Russian department at the Philosophical Faculty, has substantially contributed to the worsening of relations between Prague and Moscow with her criticism of Soviet journalists and historians. But in the leadership there is a feeling of uneasiness about Fojtik. Fojtik will perhaps have to leave by summer should Gorbachev survive the next few months.

Progress of Construction of Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Dam on Danube

24000080 Prague DOKUMENTACNI PREHLED
in Czech No 1, 89 pp G1-G5

[Report: "The Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros System of Water Works"]

[Text] A system of water projects on the Danube is being constructed jointly by Czechoslovakia and Hungary on the basis of an agreement from 16 Sep 1978 (in force since 30 Jun 1978). In October 1983 a protocol to amend the agreement was signed which established that the power plants would be put on line in the years 1990-94. In November 1988 the government approved a new protocol to amend the agreement. With the day of its signing the applicability of the protocol of October 1983 will end. The new document establishes the acceleration of construction of the water project in Gabčíkovo by 14 months and in Nagymaros by 15 months over the original term.

Outlays for the realization of the overall project are borne by both parties to the agreement in equal measure and on the basis of actually accomplished work and contributions. On 28 May 1985 representatives of Hungary and Austria signed a treaty in Vienna on the participation of Austrian construction firms. Austria has extended Hungary credit which Hungary will begin to repay on 1 Jan 1996 with electrical energy. It will provide Austria with 1.2 million KWH annually for a period of 20 years, i.e. to the end of 2015.

After completion, the Dunakiliti dam, the derived channel, Gabčíkovo stage and Nagymaros stage will be under joint proprietorship. Other components of the system realized as a joint investment will go to the proprietorship of the state on whose territory they are constructed.

The Czechoslovak side is bringing about:

- The left-bank projects of the Hrusov-Dunakiliti unit on Czechoslovak territory;
- The derived channel-tributary channel on Czechoslovak territory;

—The Gabčíkovo stage on Czechoslovak territory;

—Protective measures of the Nagymaros unit on Czechoslovak territory except for the area of the lower Ipeľ and lower Hron;

—Recultivation of Czechoslovak territory.

The Hungarian side is bringing about:

—Right-bank projects of the Hrusov-Dunakiliti unit on Czechoslovak territory including connecting and diversionary dikes on the tributary channel;

—Right-bank projects of the Hrusov-Dunakiliti unit on Hungarian territory;

—The Dunakiliti unit on Hungarian territory;

—The derived channel-drainage channel on Czechoslovak territory;

—The deepening of the Danube river channel below Palkovico on Czechoslovak and Hungarian territory;

—Improvement of the original Danube channel on Czechoslovak and Hungarian territory;

—Operating apparatus of the Gabčíkovo water project on Czechoslovak territory (operation instruments and machines for maintenance);

—Protective measures for the Nagymaros unit for the area of the lower Ipeľ and lower Hron on Czechoslovak territory;

—Protective measures for the Nagymaros unit on Hungarian territory;

—The Nagymaros stage on Hungarian territory;

—Operation apparatus of the Nagymaros water project on Hungarian territory (operation instruments and machines for maintenance);

—Deepening the channel below the Nagymaros stage on Hungarian territory;

—Recultivation on Hungarian territory.

Installations of the Gabčíkovo Water Project

The Gabčíkovo Water Project constitutes these installations:

- The Hrusov-Dunakiliti unit in the sector of the Danube on river kilometers 1860-1842, with a high-water mark 131.10 meters above the Baltic Sea on Czechoslovak and Hungarian territory;

- The Dunakiliti dam and ancillary lock on river kilometer 1842 on Hungarian territory;
- The derived channel (feeding and drainage channels) on river kilometers 1842-1811 on Czechoslovak territory;
- The stage of the derived channel on Czechoslovak territory that forms a hydroelectric plant with an installed capacity of 710 MW, two locks, and appurtenances;
- Improving the original Danube river bed on kilometers 1842-1811 in the joint Czechoslovak-Hungarian sector;
- The deepened and regulated bed of the Danube on river kilometers 1811-1791 in the joint Czechoslovak-Hungarian sector.

The dam with a reservoir between Hrusovo and Dunakiliti including the surfaces of the feeding canal will have an area of 60 square kilometers with a capacity of more than 240 million cubic meters of water. From this reservoir the water of the Danube will flow to a new river—the derived channel, which will be formed from the 17 km long tributary channel and the 8 km long drainage channel. The tributary channel with a width at the bottom of 270 to 740 m will conduct water to the hydroelectric plant in Gabčíkovo. There the current will descend 16-21.5 meters and will run eight verticle Caplan turbines with an overall output of 720 MW. The first turbine will commence operation in 1990, the last in 1992. The turbines will work 5-24 hours daily according to the flow of water in the Danube (in the meantime water will accumulate in the Hrusovo unit).

Ships will navigate through a new channel through two locks (into which will go a water train formed of one tug and nine boats, each with a draught of 1600 metric tons) and then about 20 meters lower, the eight km drainage channel to Palkovicovo, where they will return to the old bed of the Danube. At Palkovicovo the level of the Danube is raised by the dam with a hydroelectric plant constructed 110 km lower in Nagymaros.

Installations in the Nagymaros Water Project

The Nagymaros water project is made up of these installations:

- The unit and necessary protective installations in the Danube sector on river kilometers 1791-1696.25 and in the sectors of the tributaries affected by filling the reservoirs, built up for a high-water mark 107.83 meters above the Baltic Sea on Czechoslovak and Hungarian territory;
- The stage on river kilometer 1696.25 on Hungarian territory which is formed by a dam, hydroelectric plant with an installed capacity of 158 MW, two locks and appurtenances;

- The dredged and regulated Danube channel on Hungarian territory, on both of its shoulders—river kilometers 1696.25-1657.

According to the new agreements the first turbine will commence operation in 1992, the sixth (and last) in 1993. The Nagymaros stage will also operate as a regulating reservoir, from which water will freely flow over the turbines.

Significance

A system of water works represents a complex multipurpose exploitation of the Danube from km 1860 to km 1657. It will help reinforce the energy balance of the participating states. Annual supply is reckoned at 3.7 million KWH of electrical energy. The output of both hydroelectric plants will be fed into the Mir power system of the socialist states. The annual savings in lignite coal will reach about 4.5 million metric tons. Dredging the Czechoslovak-Hungarian sector of the Danube for navigation will enable a greater use of the Danube-Main-Rhine passage and connect the Black and North Seas. The navigational depth will be 3.5 meters and fords will be eliminated, especially in the Rajka-Klitzska Nema (Gonoyu) sector. This will enable the capacity of the harbors in Bratislava and Kormano to be increased and join the industrial center of the CSSR to the shipping lines. It will form the conditions for better use of the lower sectors of the Danube's tributaries (Vah, Hron, Ipel', and Maly Dunaj).

Various gatherings of opponents of the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros water project have spoken out recently in Hungary against continuing construction, especially on the Hungarian section in Nagymaros. Groups have advanced the contention that the project will disrupt the ecological balance of the region, foul the water supply and ruin archeological artifacts. The congress of the National Assembly of the HPR took up these issues in October 1988. These discussions revealed that methods for protecting nature are essential elements of the building plans. A detailed document dealing with the impact of the construction on the environment was developed in 1985, which involved the participation of 33 scientific institutions. The position of the government of the HPR affirmed construction of the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros water project according to its original conception, including Nagymaros, with the proviso that it is essential to reduce ecological risk to a minimum. The quality of the Danube water will be assured through the construction of a treatment plant. The HPR government places emphasis on informing the public of all aspects of construction.

In connection with the polemics regarding the Hungarian part of the water project in Nagymaros there arose a discussion on ecological problems on Czechoslovak territory. The Slovak Academy of Sciences, research institutes on agriculture and food and water and forest

management, Urbion Bratislava, and other organizations took part in the preparation of the territorial plan worked out in 1976. The plan directed specific measures for achieving harmony between the construction and the affected territory. The government of the SSR took up solutions for this problem in 1978. In accordance with its decision the latest data, which form the conditions for the ecologically and economically optimal use of the water project, are operationally projected into the execution of the overall project. The proposals for all ecological measures arose from the close cooperation of Czechoslovak and Hungarian specialists; the results of the long-term cooperation of the academies of science of the CSSR and HPR have been significant.

Construction of the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros water project will create conditions for protecting the adjacent areas from flooding (on the Czechoslovak side it concerns about 200,000 hectares of territory, in Hungary, at least 40,000 hectares). Intensification of agriculture production in this area will be made possible by means of large surface irrigation. The reservoir below Bratislava will become a center of the tourist trade.

Spoken-Language Deterioration in Last 40 Years Noted

24000082 Prague TVORBA in Czech 25 Jan 89 pp 1, 3

[Article by Zdenka Palkova and Jirina Novotna, staff members of the language section of the Czechoslovak Radio department of education and instruction: "Talking About Language, Especially on Radio"]

[Excerpts] In recent years we have heard an increasing number of critical voices pointing to the unsatisfactory level of spoken expression, not only on the part of student youth but also lecturers, political workers, translators and of course journalists, both in print and spoken language. Such voices we heard repeatedly also in TVORBA, quite vehemently for instance in the discussion "A Living or a Stuffed Tiger?" (No 45/1988).

Those paying detailed attention to matters of language culture are aware that an especially sensitive issue involves the level of public speaking and generally the culture of the spoken language. Special attention, often of a very critical nature, is drawn to the way journalists speak on the two most influential media of public communication, on radio and TV: "Czech as spoken on the radio ... its culture is on the brink of a natural catastrophe" (TVORBA 31/1988).

As suggested in the title of our article it is radio language above all but not exclusively that we are concerned with: it is our view that it is not just "a thing apart" but rather the concentrated reflection of a broadly general tendency. We proceed from the findings of members of the language section established since 1976 in the education and instruction department of the Czechoslovak Radio in Prague.

Radio listeners attribute a major significance to the language and speech culture in the broadcasts; they note not only the content but also the linguistic form of the individual programs. This is evidenced by the numerous comments received by telephone or letter. Even though they are often critical, such reactions should encourage us, testifying as they do to the awareness among the board public that a good language level remains a desirable value.

But radio journalists should take this as an obligation: radio is an institution with a high degree of social prestige, and the language of those who represent this institution by speaking on its broadcasts has a pronounced impact on forming language norms in the listener's mind. It provides them with speech patterns which they ultimately adopt, good as well as bad. No radio (or, for that matter, TV) editor can escape this responsibility for the cultural level of the national language.

Critique of the handling of the Czech language on radio comes in many forms and therefore requires differentiated responses.

The shortcomings which are usually spotted by listeners include the speaker's interpretation flaws: sloppy pronunciation, speech defects, unevenness of rhythm, unsuitable tempo, illogical breaks, and the like. These are "speech flaws" which often reduce intelligibility and always are detrimental to the clarity of the text; they burden or distract the listener's attention. Moreover, these flaws more than others suggest that the speaker is not sufficiently familiar with what he is doing, which usually detracts from his authority as well as that of his topic.

Another area of criticism involves imprecision in expressing a thought or disregard for textual consistency. Here we have for instance wrong use of grammatical linkages within sentences as between them, unsuitable choice of words, or a confusing organization of the subject. Spoken language is more susceptible to this kind of flawed expression and more damaging than a written text, which permits the reader to return to a less intelligible passage.

Radio listeners also note excessive repetition of standard phrases, use of clichés taken from the administrative style, and criticize abundant use of technical slang expressions. Thus they generally assume that radio language should have a clear and perspicuous structure, as well as offer a variety of approaches to define subjects and express thoughts comprehensibly and effectively.

Listeners also frequently criticize the use of expressions which are or which they believe to be below literary standards. [passage omitted]

Radio broadcasts consist of a broad range of programs, from official statements and information to live discussion or reportage, all of which require different language patterns. What makes the matter even more complicated is that in all cases the radio broadcast is a public communication, and so is always evaluated by the listener. [passage omitted]

Adherence to certain formal rules of "correctness" (which may even seem superfluous from the point of view of simple communication) is, as we have seen, also an expression of the speaker's respect for the listener; thus they constitute part of the citizen's language culture. We hope that they are a positive part. Relations between people who are basically strangers to each other are not one of the strengths of our society's contemporary life, although they should be. Talking "just like the folks do" is often regarded as an expression of directness, unaffected behavior, individual contact among speakers. But it also expresses the speaker's insistence on his own personal usage and comfort, without regard for the listening partner. If I learned from the wrong folks, it's "just bad luck" for the listener. In truly private expressions where partners in the dialogue frequently share the same spoken usages (for instance, in the family), the negative consequences of this individualization are weakened and a feeling of intimacy predominates. In communication between strangers (or people not sufficiently familiar) what predominates is rather the speaker's lack of respect for the listener. For instance a radio program which noticeably fails the standards of literary language is often viewed by listeners as a kind of discourtesy, a social faux pas.

If we search deeper for the sources and motivations of the antipathy to demands for respecting language correctness in public speaking, radio practice again will offer useful guides.

The literary form of language is in a certain (good) sense an artificial, cultivated creation, and we must learn to use it. The culture of language, just as the culture of everything else, necessarily contains a certain degree of conscious effort. If we are not accustomed or willing to exert an effort, we will find it easy to seek the cause of an unsatisfactory result or one's own uneasy feeling in the language itself. If we are greatly unaccustomed and a great effort is required, the unwillingness is extreme.

It would not be a good thing to excuse radio journalists whose language is not up to par. The listener has a right to expect that their profession has taught them how to use the language. But let us recognize that their task is not an easy one and that the general climate of our language culture is hardly helpful to them.

The notion of a uniform literary language base was originally tied to its written form since that was the basis of public communication. The majority of the people were more frequently its recipients rather than creators. But this situation has changed radically in the last four decades.

Spoken language has become an equivalent means of public social communication. In individual life too there has been a substantial increase in the number of occasions on which one needs to be able to speak on more complex topics and in a socially more demanding set of circumstances than for instance in private dialogue.

Practice shows that one cannot very well raise demands on the culture or written and spoken language in separation (as is sometimes done). They are two heads of the same dragon and if we struggle with one, we always intuitively feel the presence of the other. Responses from radio listeners indicate that the notion of cultured refinement is connected also for spoken language with the notion of linguistic correctness, and the ordinary user of language tends to get even more exacting than a theoretical linguist. It is also evident that defective expression in spoken language dilutes the awareness of any standard at all: one loses "certitude" even in a written text.

Yet speaking is a practical activity in which time is the master; it requires not only knowledge but also ready facility. Knowing how to organize the thought as well as the language presupposes a habit which is not born from one day to another. Radio practice confirms ordinary experience: speech patterns do not grow by themselves but rather by proper usage. The need to communicate forces us to use the tool of language. If the objective is difficult, it is necessary to learn to use the tool more effectively, as is the case in every human activity.

The demand on each of us to be able to speak effectively has increased substantially, yet during these four decades there has been hardly any improvement in school instruction on the active use of language (rather the opposite is true). To the extent it exists, it involves mostly the use of written language.

But let us return to the field of radio. The language of its editors, considering their average age, may be regarded as emblematic of the evolution in spoken Czech over the past few decades—a rather better end product of this evolution, to be sure, because it is usually accompanied by thoughtfulness, good will, and theoretical knowledge. If we have the feeling of a "natural catastrophe" it probably means that the fault lies in the aforementioned "democratic" attitude toward the use of language. This permits an excessively widening gap between the practical life's demand on the level of spoken communication and one's willingness to accommodate this demand.

Discussions of the basic orientation in teaching Czech are beginning to focus on the problem of spoken language; TVORBA's roundtable, referred to earlier, supplies the clearest evidence. But for the most part the discussions connect this aspect of the "mother tongue" topic merely with a vocal interpretation of literary works, especially poetry. It is our view that it is also of the essence to provide education in one's own speech on a higher level of precision with regard to both content and language than is derived from ordinary daily conversation.

But let us finish the main theme. The average standard of language used in Czech broadcasting was traditionally good. The gradual but persistent trend toward deterioration was noted by many radio staffers and at least some editorial teams even before the public began calling attention to its effects. An organized effort to assure a more favorable trend has been under way, as already noted, for some ten years. While it has brought results, a rapid change is not to be expected. Only a persistent active effort can improve the debased standard of spoken language. Let us give credit to the Czechoslovak Radio's staffers for their growing willingness to respect the language.

But we should not forget that language is a collective affair. A radical improvement in the culture of contemporary Czech can be attained only by a joint effort of all who are served by the language. And, clearly, two things must be involved: thorough education and avidity for knowledge.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

FRG Weekly Interviews Author on SED Reform
23000102 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German
Vol 43 No 6, 6 Feb 89 pp 69, 72-73, 75, 77, 80

[Interview with GDR author Stephan Hermlin by DER SPIEGEL editors Wolfram Bickerich and Ulrich Schwarz: "Above All, We Need Glasnost"; date and place not given]

[Text] Stephan Hermlin is one of the last German writers whose output is highly regarded in both German states. Hermlin, born in 1915 to upper-middle-class Jewish parents, became a communist at the early age of 16, worked in the resistance during the Nazi period, lastly in the French resistance. In 1947 he went to East Berlin and became a member of the SED [Socialist Unity Party of Germany (GDR)]. Initially, Hermlin contributed party-line hymns and stories to the developing GDR (about such things as Stalin and 17 June 1953) but, while remaining loyal to the SED, started voicing criticism about persistent tendencies in his country as early as the 1950's. In 1976 he was a prime mover for the protest by East German intellectuals against the expatriation of songwriter Wolf Biermann. In 1981 he organized the "Berlin Encounter" in the East German capital, in which authors from the FRG, Austria, Switzerland and the GDR for the first time discussed East-West problems in an unusually unrestrained manner. Hermlin became controversial because of his attacks against those of his colleagues who had emigrated from the GDR; but he also aroused suspicion among SED functionaries; he always openly acknowledged his upper-middle-class origins. This SED intellectuals' ties with the GDR's Council of State chairman are based not solely upon their common antifascist past: Erich Honecker and Hermlin truly like one another.

[DER SPIEGEL] Mr Hermlin, are human rights being respected in the GDR, in your opinion?

[Hermlin] I do not see them respected anywhere.

[DER SPIEGEL] We are asking about conditions in your particular country. You are not living "anywhere."

[Hermlin] True. I have always believed that fruitful cooperation by states for promoting human rights can succeed only if everyone puts his own house in order first.

[DER SPIEGEL] The GDR appears to be using a great variety of criteria for doing that: Last January it approved the final document of the CSCE Followup Conference in Vienna, which deals with observing human rights, emigration, freedom of information and religion. At the same time, the East German Government has prohibited distribution of the Soviet magazine SPUTNIK, has banned Soviet films from theaters, it censors religious publications and arrests peaceful demonstrators. How is all that compatible?

[Hermlin] It is certainly partially incompatible. But on the other hand, look at it this way: At a time when in such places as West Berlin the police uses nightsticks on people, it is not terribly appropriate to make a fuss about detentions which may only last 48 hours, as they did recently in Leipzig. I do not believe it is right to view all this in the overall context of human rights.

On the one hand, I want to see the GDR observe and extend human and civil rights. On the other hand, I cannot overlook the way the West is beating this subject to death. I find it curious for instance that so much attention is being paid to restriction of human rights in the USSR and the GDR while at the same time a country like Iran has during the last few weeks executed hundreds, and probably thousands, who however have a questionable quality which gives them small news value: they are communists.

[DER SPIEGEL] Let us quote Stephan Hermlin to rebut Stephan Hermlin: Let everyone put his own house in order first.

[Hermlin] I repeat, let everyone put his own house in order. But that applies to you as well as to me. You are forever interested in human rights in the GDR, not in the FRG. The entire discussion must acknowledge that there is some basic disagreement on the definition of human rights. The socialist states for instance consider, correctly, in my opinion, the right to work to be a basic human right. This is being violated daily in the West in millions of cases.

[DER SPIEGEL] The only difference is this: In the West there are public discussions about those human rights violations; in your country there is no opportunity for making such violations public.

[Hermlin] I consider this to be one of our serious deficiencies. At this time, the question of public debate continues to go unresolved—perhaps even more unresolved at this moment than it was some time ago.

[DER SPIEGEL] The kind of public debate which is possible in Gorbachev's USSR?

[Hermlin] Yes. I am firmly convinced that in the final analysis socialism can only prevail in the open.

[DER SPIEGEL] At a time when other socialist countries dare to be more out in the open, the SED leadership is retreating into its bunker. Why?

[Hermlin] I am not familiar with the true background. I can only guess at it. It is not being divulged, after all. Obviously, there are worries here concerning the way things are going in the USSR on the one hand, but also concerning the overall economic situation of the socialist camp. The GDR, a relatively successful country in the economic area, wants to do everything possible to avoid being sucked into a vacuum which can be felt all around it.

[DER SPIEGEL] This is not a matter of economics. The drift created by Gorbachev is targeted toward reform of the socialist society.

[Hermlin] Societal reform in the GDR is a different story from that in the USSR. The GDR is free from a vast number of problems facing the USSR. Take the problem of nationalities for one, which creates major questions. The GDR has fewer areas of neglect than has the USSR, where matters had long been swept under the rug.

[DER SPIEGEL] However, the GDR shares a crucial problem with the USSR: the growing urge of the citizens to have a say; political participation, self-determination—to use a new German word: to have glasnost.

[Hermlin] I guess we agree almost completely on that.

[Hermlin] Why does the SED leadership refuse to countenance an opening of its society? Because of arrogance?

[Hermlin] No, hardly. Nor do I believe that the leaders of the GDR are in complete agreement among themselves on this question.

[DER SPIEGEL] When Politbureau member Kurt Hager stated that there was no need for the GDR to put up new wallpaper because its neighbor, the USSR was doing it, his Politbureau colleague Horst Dohlus recently went him one better: The SED, he said, had long ago settled

the question of what socialism was all about—specifically, 18 years ago, at the 8th Party Conference, with the formula of the oneness of economic and social policy. The 8th Party Conference was the first one in Erich Honecker's reign. This would seem to be the height of arrogance.

[Hermlin] I would not call that arrogance. Let us not forget that we are here in the motherland or fatherland of Marxist thinking and that great philosophical-political questions were first solved and thought out in Germany. Also, I consider the formula enunciated at the 8th Party Conference to be basically valid.

[DER SPIEGEL] But the formula about the oneness of economic and social policy does nothing more than express the truism that even the socialist society cannot distribute more products than it has previously produced. What does that have to do with the nature of socialism?

[Hermlin] What we are lacking is the courage to apply questions specifically to individual areas of the human existence under socialism. Apart from our philosophical-political tradition, we also have a bad tradition of reeling off formulas which were established at one time and which are repeated ad infinitum. What we need to ask ourselves is this: What does the oneness of economic and social policy look like in the year 1989? What do I have to do to implement it?

I have vivid memories of the 8th Party Conference—that was when an end was put, once and for all, to a policy of cultural dogmatism—a great breakthrough.

[DER SPIEGEL] It was replaced with a dogmatic formula on the oneness of economic and social policy.

[Hermlin] It always happens that a well-founded truth is turned into dogma in the absence of what is today known as "new thinking."

[DER SPIEGEL] And this is lacking?

[Hermlin] It is lacking. This constitutes one of our essential tasks; we cannot just skip over it with a few empty phrases or with irony—it is our duty to get with this "new thinking" seriously, which in fact exists already in the GDR too to a certain extent—but only to a certain extent. Honecker's announcement that the GDR would reduce its troop strength by 10,000 soldiers is a manifestation of this new thinking, which the GDR has been employing in the arms reduction area for some years.

[DER SPIEGEL] Do you think the leadership of your country is capable of learning in other areas as well?

[Hermlin] That is a difficult question. In answering it, I would express some hope, but also skepticism. There is one thing we must bear in mind: We are now in a

replacement phase—I am saying this with all deliberation. Nobody can tell today to what extent this replacement process will have positive results. I cannot judge this. I can say this, because I am one of those who will be replaced—inevitably. What comes after...learning capability? I hope so. It certainly is not too late for that.

[DER SPIEGEL] Comrade Hermlin has been forthright in describing his attitude toward Gorbachev: You have called Gorbachev's glasnost and perestroika policies a second October Revolution, "certainly of equal significance."

[Hermlin] That is still my opinion.

[DER SPIEGEL] That second revolution then is a socialist one, like the first. What do perestroika and glasnost mean to the SED?

[Hermlin] In my opinion, our primary need is for glasnost. Perestroika is not all that important; glasnost is an overriding requirement.

[DER SPIEGEL] Where would it have to start?

[Hermlin] I want to give you a quote related to me a few weeks ago by a friend of mine. Just prior to the last writers' congress in the fall of 1987, that friend had a talk with a high-ranking comrade here in Berlin. That man told him: One thing is certain—you produce literature, but we take care of the politics.

That is a statement which you might say comes straight out of the lack of glasnost. If you recall Lenin's dictum that any cook must be capable of running the country, you get a feeling for the abyss which separates Lenin's idea from the foregoing statement. It is not enough, for example, that the constantly repeated motto "Plan with us, work with us, govern with us" is always interpreted as applying only to the manufacturing level. In reality, communists can have no doubt that it is a guideline applying at the state level.

[DER SPIEGEL] You have asked those in your country and in the West who think that the GDR is developing too slowly, to allow "a 1 to 2 year grace period." Aren't you too optimistic, as far as that time span is concerned?

[Hermlin] Perhaps.

[DER SPIEGEL] Does the SED leadership have unlimited time to implement reforms?

[Hermlin] No one has unlimited time. Why should we have unlimited time? But I am not a prophet.

[DER SPIEGEL] The SED leadership is faced with an entirely new situation: For the first time since 1953 there is grumbling in the party's rank and file. Entire party

organizations have protested in a body to the Central Committee against the SPUTNIK ban. How long will the party leadership be able to ignore pressure from below?

[Hermlin] You are right about the facts you mention. I must say it once again: I am not a prophet. I cannot give an answer to your question. But the unrest within the party confirms the ever-vigilant optimism lurking below my pessimism to the effect that we are maturing. A great maturing process is going on among the communists. This is of decisive importance for the future. The people are getting in closer touch with their own identity, about the role they have to play in a socialist state, that they are not merely required to receive orders and stand at attention—but rather, that they are free people and that great objectives cannot always be reached without big mistakes being made.

[DER SPIEGEL] Up to now, the party bosses have reacted to this maturing process in a very immature manner—with counterpressure. The maturation process has apparently made greater headway in the rank and file than at the top?

[Hermlin] I do not want to reply to that. I do wish to say that, along with many others in this country, I feel very badly about the SPUTNIK ban, and that I consider the ban on some excellent Soviet films to be a catastrophe. This applies also to recent examples of increased censorship.

[DER SPIEGEL] Have you ever been censored?

[Hermlin] Yes, indeed.

[DER SPIEGEL] Recently?

[Hermlin] No, not recently. Last fall, for the first time in more than 30 years, I was asked to write an article for NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, about the November 1938 pogroms. I accepted, but stated that I would not accept any deletions or changes unless they had been discussed with me. There were no deletions, no changes. The article was published just as I had written it. The increased censorship to which I had reference does not affect literature nor the theater, where excellent programs are continuing; it principally affects television.

[DER SPIEGEL] Might the explanation for this be that while the socialist high command makes concessions to those interested in the arts, it exercises close control over the intellectual intake of the masses?

[Hermlin] If that is the case, there is some misapprehension; literature is not restricted to a small segment.

[DER SPIEGEL] Bureaucrats may think it is.

[Hermlin] You surely are well aware of the fact that there are enormous contingents of readers here who devour any interesting book, and that this literature continues to exert great influence.

[DER SPIEGEL] As to television censorship—do you have examples?

[Hermlin] Recently, a Buechner film was initially banned, but later shown late at night without announcement. It was a good and interesting film.

[DER SPIEGEL] And what was the reason for the initial ban?

[Hermlin] I don't know. But of course I know our dogmatists well enough to know that even though they were dealing with one of the outstanding revolutionary German poets, they are uncomfortable with complex questions which defy a simple answer; they get stuffed into a drawer. They must, for instance, have straight information about the nature of "Danton's Death." Is it a revolutionary, or perhaps a reactionary play? After all, it ends with Lucile Desmoulins calling out to a patrol: "Vive le roi!" She wants to die, because her husband has been executed. And she is being taken away. That is the final curtain of "Danton's Death."

But that is what happens in revolutions. The dogmatists can't stand it. This is the only way I can explain it. Television does not fall, after all, under the supervision of the Ministry of Culture.

[DER SPIEGEL] ...but?

[Hermlin] It comes under the Agitation and Propaganda Department of the SED Central Committee.

[DER SPIEGEL] Do you have any other examples of censorship?

[Hermlin] I was quite upset about some cuts in a film celebrating the birthday of Friedrich Wolf, whom I had known personally; one of our great playwrights. The film was shown, but only after certain parts had been edited out.

[DER SPIEGEL] For instance?

[Hermlin] For instance those passages dealing with the years of emigration to Moscow and which provide an insight to the feelings of people such as Friedrich Wolf, during the Moscow trials.

[DER SPIEGEL] Is there a connection between the censoring of the Wolf film and the SPUTNIK ban and the fact that the GDR has never been truly destalinized?

[Hermlin] I know that in your country the GDR is widely considered to be a Stalinist state.

[DER SPIEGEL] We beg to differ: The GDR is a state that is no longer Stalinist, but that is led by people who used to be Stalinists.

[Hermlin] I was a Stalinist too. Any communist who was not a sectarian, was a Stalinist.

[DER SPIEGEL] Did destalinization take place in the GDR?

[Hermlin] I would call your attention to the fact that of all the peoples' democracies the GDR was the only state to offer resistance to Beria's orders. At the time, Beria made the rounds of all the capitals. He wanted heads to roll everywhere; people made their obeisance to him everywhere and delivered the heads he wanted—the most outstanding communists in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania—until he came upon a tough, courageous man: Walter Ulbricht. He said to Beria, "Go back home."

[DER SPIEGEL] Apart from terror, Stalinism means a totalitarian kind of political regime. The arrests in Leipzig, the censorship of the clerical press are Stalinist methods.

[Hermlin] That is true for all socialist countries. Stalinism is a basic heritage of the socialist countries. The socialist countries could come into being only via Stalinism. Certainly the GDR carries the Stalinist heritage in its own way, just as any socialist state carries this heritage and will continue to carry it for a long time to come. That is how dreadful the impact of that figure was on the way to socialism.

[DER SPIEGEL] Until such time as sentences of that sort appear in the SED's main publication, NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, the GDR has not come to terms with its own Stalinism, in our opinion.

[Hermlin] We have a habit, which may appear curious to others, but it is traditional with us: We try to correct the mistakes of the past, without admitting their existence.

[DER SPIEGEL] Have you personally destalinized yourself? You once produced a Hymn to Stalin, with which you are still identified.

[Hermlin] I wrote three poems about Stalin during the period 1941 to 1951. This doesn't bother me in the least, because I am who I am today, but at the same time who I was then. I know what we communists were like who suffered cruel persecution all over the world, who faced the headman's axe or a death sentence day after day and whose hopes for the future were incarnate in the name of Stalin.

[DER SPIEGEL] And at the time you had no interest at all in Stalin's crimes?

[Hermlin] At that time, in contrast to the majority of my compatriots, I was more interested in Hitler's crimes. Hoelderlin wrote a marvelous poem about Gustav Adolf. The Germans had no national hero, so Hoelderlin made a Swedish king his national hero. And as a matter of fact, Gustav Adolf was the savior of the gospel. How he saved it and under what circumstances is another matter, which is no longer of interest today. It is well known that the Swedes engaged in looting and arson, that they tortured peasants to death to get their money.

[DER SPIEGEL] Thousands of communists are interested in the manner in which Stalin treated socialism and the comrades.

[Hermlin] Many who were not alive at the time, do not want to acknowledge that Stalin, like Napoleon, was at the same time a liberator and a butcher who committed terrible crimes against his people. For that reason you cannot compare Stalin with Hitler, which people keep trying to do. Stalin, who was a mass murderer, carried a tremendous burden himself, as do all communists—his humanistic roots. Fascism was a purely genocidal, racist-based theory of eradicating masses for the benefit of the master race.

[DER SPIEGEL] The dead don't really care why they were butchered.

[Hermlin] The dead don't care about anything. Nothing can be restored except their honor, and except the fact that Bukharin and others have been anointed as exemplary communists many decades after their cruel deaths.

[DER SPIEGEL] They cannot be brought back to life. It cannot be done in total silence.

[Hermlin] Of course not.

[DER SPIEGEL] As it is done in the GDR.

[Hermlin] That is exactly what I am against.

[DER SPIEGEL] In 1976 you were one of those GDR intellectuals who, in a letter to the party leadership, expressed objection to Wolf Biermann's expatriation. But some 11 years later, after the Rosa Luxemburg demonstration of 17 January 1988, when dissidents were again arrested or deported, you said nothing.

[Hermlin] That, to me, is an entirely different matter. Twelve years ago I was outraged by the fact that a gifted man was kicked out of the GDR. That was the basic outrage, which I still feel today. Biermann was a citizen of the GDR who wanted to stay in the GDR, who wanted to be free to express his view in an artistic manner.

I have understanding for young people who want to emigrate from the GDR. I wish they were given the opportunity to emigrate. But they must not count on my

sympathy if they hide behind a sentence of Rosa Luxemburg's, behind her image, which has nothing whatever to do with them. I recently spoke out against people who are leaving the GDR comparing themselves with anti-fascist emigrants. I still feel that way. We have nothing in common. What is involved are entirely different matters, different dangers, thoughts, goals.

[DER SPIEGEL] The young people who want to emigrate are, after all, a minority in the GDR's environmental, peace and human rights groups. The majority is striving to change the GDR toward more democracy—like Gorbachev.

[Hermlin] There are differences. I can see those young people who want to accelerate socialism in the GDR on their own initiative—they include my son and my grandchildren—but I have seen others as well. I am suspicious of many others, because I recognize in them an almost totally unrestrained egocentricity and egotism.

[DER SPIEGEL] Is the desire to see the Cologne cathedral or the Eiffel Tower all that reprehensible?

[Hermlin] I am in favor of the greatest possible freedom to travel. I can detect some progress in this respect, which is still insufficient. I hope for further progress. But I do not believe that this can be accomplished all that easily by the GDR. I know that the GDR leadership has some basic problems in dealing with it.

[DER SPIEGEL] Such as?

[Hermlin] Such as the foreign currency question and the continuing state of confusion between the two German states, which will have to be resolved some day—especially the question of citizenship.

[DER SPIEGEL] Mr Hermlin, your party chief, reacting to statements by Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign Minister Genscher at the CSCE Followup Conference in Vienna, said that the Wall will still be standing 100 years from now, because the GDR must be protected against robbers from the West.

[Hermlin] Unless there is a change in the conditions which originally led to the building of the Wall.

[DER SPIEGEL] Has there been no change?

[Hermlin] Not enough. Suddenly everyone talks about the Wall. There are many other problems which must be resolved first.

[DER SPIEGEL] Such as, who are the robbers?

[Hermlin] Not everything is clear immediately.

[DER SPIEGEL] Do you think that the Wall forecast is correct?

[Hermlin] I do not. I do not believe the Wall will last another 100 years, not even 50 years, if things continue to move in the direction they are at present.

I don't understand why a reasonable, deliberate, intelligent politician like Genscher would suddenly start to talk about the Wall, particularly at the end of the CSCE. Those are slips of the tongue which provoke slips of the tongue from the other side. Suddenly we find ourselves again in superfluous arguments, while the real process for tearing down the Wall quietly continues at other levels.

[DER SPIEGEL] Before the GDR can afford to tear down the Wall, there must first exist basic trust between the leadership and the people.

[Hermlin] I agree fully.

[DER SPIEGEL] But there is practically no hint of this.

[Hermlin] No hint? I don't believe that; but there are great deficiencies. I want to emphasize this: It is a grave mistake not to place greater trust in one's own people; not to credit the people with greater capability. These people are competent. They are, sad to say, easy to lead. The Germans have always been easy to lead. What in hell do these people have to accomplish before that condition of distrust or insufficient trust will be lifted from them?

[DER SPIEGEL] Thank you for this interview, Mr Hermlin.

HUNGARY

Talks Held With Austrian Socialists on Convergence

23000106b Vienna PROFIL in German 30 Jan 89 p 31

[Article by Michael Siegert: "De-Kadarization, De-Kreiskyization"]

[Text] In the middle of coping with the "burdens of the past" of the Kreisky era—Blecha had already resigned and Gratz had just taken over—the top functionaries of the SPOe [Socialist Party of Austria] on Saturday, 21 January, met with a high-ranking delegation of the Hungarian state party, which is struggling over its own problems in reappraising the Kadar era. Almost unnoticed by the Austrian public Heinz Fischer, Karl Blecha and Ferdinand Lacina fraternized with Rezso Nyers, Sandor Berecz and company in the Renner Institute in Vienna-Altmannsdorf in the intimate atmosphere of a Biedermeier-style building.

Memories of the Eisenstadt Declaration of the SPOe from the Kreisky era ("The Socialists are uncompromising and inflexible adversaries of fascism as well as communism," 1969) were washed down during lunch of lean beef in the adjacent hotel with a drop of new Veltliner.

A group of SPOe feminists listened to the exchange of opinions for a while, but then, bored, left the "petit-bourgeois men's club." The SPOe women's secretary, Irmtraud Karlsson, caustically commented: "The Hungarians are even more petit bourgeois than the Austrians."

But the discussion in the hall brought to light something that was politically incredible. Two party leaderships in crisis told each other their troubles. When Finance Minister Lacina spoke of budget problems in pension financing, Hungary's Economics Minister Nyers answered: "When I listen to my colleague Lacina I think to myself: If you only knew how much narrower our leeway is!"

The creator of Hungary's economic miracle reviewed its end: "At present we have reverted to the real wage level of 1973. This year we are going to get another drop of 4 to 6 percent, then we are back to 1971. The Hungarian economy has been shrinking for 6 years." He said the inflation was 15 percent (20 percent is what the Hungarian journalists dryly said in the anteroom).

"The Kadar leadership got us into a mess with the high foreign indebtedness," Nyers revealed to the Austrian Socialist leaders. "In 1985 it made the big mistake of putting the economic reform on ice and of financing economic growth in the framework of the old structure with foreign funds. In doing so, the mountain of debts of \$8 billion doubled in 2 years."

"Kadar," Nyers brushed his old mentor aside, "unfortunately misunderstood the Soviet events. He was correct in saying that Hungary, as regards perestroika, has gone further than the Soviet Union and that there was nothing we could learn from that. But he underestimated glasnost. Kadar started from the assumption that glasnost was no big deal and that we are further along in that respect, too. But we had only a quarter of that glasnost."

The leader of the liberal wing pushes de-Kadarization even further along: "Where he erred most of all: Gorbachev started with 3 slogans—glasnost, perestroika, uskorenje (acceleration). The latter was most sympathetic to Kadar, that is truly the socialist way! He said: The socialists should learn something from the conservatives, with respect to fiscal policy, savings...."

This topic was then also taken up by the number-two man of the MSZMP [Hungarian Socialist Workers Party], ideology secretary Janos Berecz: "After all, in Hungary we are the conservatives, we are the Thatcher government—small wonder that opposition groups spring up everywhere!"

In the past, Berecz had always been regarded as a man slowing things down but recently he has repeatedly surprised his opponents. When he returned from a visit to Prague he said that, in his opinion, the demonstrations at Wenceslas Square are not dangerous, in this

respect he is of a "completely different opinion" than the CSSR leadership. In answer to the question whether or not Hungary is now experiencing something like a Prague Spring of 1968, he answered: "We are already in the middle of it."

Finally reformer Nyers told the surprised SPOe leadership that the best way out of the crisis would be offered by a center-left coalition between MSZMP, the resurrected Social Democrats and the Small Farmers Party (see Nyers interview which follows this article). "Hungary is in a predicament, therefore it has to go in the direction of Social Democracy."

He said he has already talked with the new Social Democrats, his old fellow party members. "On the one hand they say the party (MSZMP) has led us into the fiscal crisis, for that we do not assume any responsibility. On the other hand they state that they are ready to cooperate." If no coalition can be achieved, the new parties would be important and valuable as parliamentary opposition.

In the fall when parliament started the debate on the law relating to associations (it was approved on 11 January), the political groups grew like mushrooms. In spring the constitution is to be changed, in late summer a new law concerning the political parties will further open possibilities for activities of the "associations." The first free elections in a communist country are planned for the fall of 1990.

The Hungarian writer Istvan Csurka of the "Democratic Forum,"—with a side-glance at big brother—felt: "We must convince the voters not to vote the party out completely."

Nyers: Socialism Not Prerequisite for Political Role

23000106c Vienna PROFIL in German
30 Jan 89 pp 32-33

[Interview with Rezso Nyers by Michael Siebert: "Three-Party Coalition for Hungary"; date and place not given; first paragraph is PROFIL's brief biography of Nyers]

[Text] Rezso Nyers, 65, Kadar's arch reformer, started his political career in 1940 as a young printer by joining the Social Democratic Party. In 1948 he participated in the fusion of the Communist Party and the Social Democratic Party. He studied economics in Budapest from 1951 to 1956 and as the party's secretary for economics (since 1962) eased the controls on the centralist planned economy.

[PROFIL] Mr Nyers, do you believe you can learn something from the SPOe?

[Nyers] Undoubtedly. From its economic policy, its labor policy, its views on self-administration, and its work in parliament—we can learn something from all that.

[PROFIL] The SPOe was responsible for the nationalized sector of our economy which is now in the throes of a crisis. You have similar problems with your industry in Hungary. What lesson do you draw from the reorganization of the nationalized enterprises in Austria?

[Nyers] The problem we face in Hungary is very similar to that in Austria. Our nationalized industry has high losses to contend with. We have the problem of a rational investment policy in common.

[PROFIL] With us one of the reorganization measures is partial privatization. Are you going to try that, too, perhaps by bringing in foreign capital into the Hungarian state industry?

[Nyers] Yes, we are trying to achieve that. Examples of that already do exist: For example, the Tungsram electrical plant has placed stocks in Western markets—a few, but it is a beginning.

[PROFIL] You established a stock exchange in Budapest. Are foreigners able to acquire stocks of Hungarian enterprises?

[Nyers] Our aim is that something like that is possible without any problems. The development of the stock market creates the conditions to that end; a realistic assessment of the resources will be achieved only in that way. Until now we have established the connection with foreign capital principally by joint ventures, of which there are about 80.

[PROFIL] How big is the latitude for the private economy. I understand private enterprises are permitted to have up to 50 employees.

[Nyers] It depends on what you consider as "private." If the enterprise does not belong to a family but is organized as a limited liability company or a corporation, then it can employ up to 500 people. Our aim is for the private sector to fully utilize its capacities, a situation from which we are still far removed. The share of private capital—domestic and foreign combined—in the Hungarian economy is now between 6 and 8 percent. That is, after all, very little.

[PROFIL] As a result of economic reform you also have unemployment. Are you going to use the Western social policy as a model and introduce employment offices and unemployment pay?

[Nyers] Employment offices for our present 50,000 unemployed already exist. Our unemployment rate is only half a percent of the gainfully employed, in your

case it is 5 percent. This year it could reach one percent and could then rise even more. Of course, a social net is very important but the financial leeway in Hungary is less than in your case.

[PROFIL] Because of the present crisis, of the progressive loss of the workers' real wages, would it be possible for a big social conflict, a series of strikes like those in Poland in 1980, to occur in Hungary?

[Nyers] It could come to that, but that is not an immediate danger.

[PROFIL] If you do not find the right way out of this crisis, does this danger exist?

[Nyers] Yes.

[PROFIL] You have emphasized again and again the necessity for political liberalization, so that economic liberalization can actually become effective. Gorbachev has floated the slogan of "socialist pluralism." In your country there is already talk of a multiparty system. What is the Hungarian road?

[Nyers] We are not tied to the Soviet solution. Our variant will be different from that of the Soviets. We have reached the point where we also consider a multiparty system as a possibility. The other parties in Hungary are now in an organizing phase, they are not yet real parties. According to a decision of the National Assembly, by 1 August 1989, the draft of a law concerning the parties—that regulates the establishment of parties—must be before the parliamentary body. This law will probably make the establishment of several parties possible.

[PROFIL] In the past it had always been stated that the parties must affirm socialism. Are you going to drop this restriction?

[Nyers] We only ask that they remain within the framework of the constitution.

[PROFIL] No longer any avowal of socialism?

[Nyers] No, but the parties must accept the constitutional order and there will be reference to socialism as course and direction. But you can also advocate capitalist interests.

[PROFIL] Isn't the "leading role" of the Hungarian Socialist Unity Party (MSZMP) also included in your constitution?

[Nyers] At present, yes, but in the new constitution, which is being prepared, it will no longer appear in this form. In the framework of a 1-party system, such a paragraph is necessary. It means that the party leadership calls the shots with respect to the armed executive, in other words the military and the police. In a multiparty system, parliament becomes the leading force.

[PROFIL] The newly developing parties, are they going to have to organize themselves within the party-controlled "People's Front," as is the case in Yugoslavia?

[Nyers] No, they would develop as independent parties.

[PROFIL] On 28 November 1988, the Social Democratic Party was reconstituted in Hungary. Are you able to envision the Social Democracy assuming sometime the leadership in a future Hungarian government if it were to receive a plurality in the elections?

[Nyers] Not yet.

[PROFIL] Do you believe your party, the MSZMP, would receive the majority if other parties are permitted to field candidates in the elections in the coming year?

[Nyers] I do not know whether my party would receive the absolute majority, I believe it would receive a plurality. I think a Social Democratic Party in Hungary, in addition to the MSZMP, could play a positive role, both as a partner and as a counterweight, as a kind of social conscience.

[PROFIL] In the opposition?

[Nyers] I hope it will not be in the opposition.

[PROFIL] In other words, in the government?

[Nyers] We must act in solidarity with one another. There is no obstacle to it joining the government. It depends on how strong it will be. The Social Democrats would become the opposition if a 2-party system developed in Hungary and these two would take turns in government. But if additional parties develop, then it will be found that the MSZMP and the Social Democrats are closest to each other with respect to interests and philosophy.

[PROFIL] Of course there will also be other parties. On 18 November 1988 the Small Farmers Party was also newly established. Is it your opinion that the MSZMP should form a coalition government with the Social Democrats with the Small Farmers Party as the opposition?

[Nyers] That would be conceivable but at present we seek a broader coalition, one in which the Small Farmers Party, as a positive center party, plays a role, in other words a coalition of the left and the center.

[PROFIL] An all-party government?

[Nyers] I would say that would not be an all-party government but a majority government because, after all, other parties can come into being, too.

[PROFIL] Mr Nyers, in your youth you, yourself, were a member of the Social Democratic Party of Hungary. With the "New March Front" you have harked back to

the opposition coalition against the Horthy dictatorship. This coalition also governed immediately after the war. Is this model coming back now?

[Nyers] Not in this form, but something like it would be conceivable.

[PROFIL] Do you envision that as the way out of the severe economic crisis in which Hungary is now mired?

[Nyers] Yes. These parties should assume a national responsibility. But I think it is also possible that the management and solution of the crisis will be up to the MSZMP and the others do not want to participate in it at all.

[PROFIL] Mr Nyers, do you regard yourself as the leader of the Social Democratic wing of the MSZMP, as you are frequently referred to in the Western media?

[Nyers] I am a reform communist. What I have in mind, above all, is a communist-social democratic synthesis. I do not believe that there is already a convergence in fact of both social systems but, in searching for new paths, European Social Democrats and the east Central European reform communist movement come closer to each other, develop a convergence.

[PROFIL] Is that the reason why you are interested in the traditionally integralist SPOe? The Austrian Social Democrats in the early twenties after all occupied an intermediate position between the Second (socialist) International and the Third (communist) International. Here in Vienna Otto Bauer created the so-called International No. Two and a Half.

[Nyers] Yes, Otto Bauer. Austrian Marxism is important to us; in its way of thinking and views it can still have a stimulating effect on the labor movement. That could be the real synthesis.

[PROFIL] Now other forms of internationalism are already being discussed, more capitalist ones. The Yugoslavs are moving towards the EC. Do you, too, want to join EFTA or the EC?

[Nyers] We could join EFTA even now, that wouldn't be any problem on our part. We are also establishing relations with the European Parliament. We hope for collaboration with the Social Democrats in the framework of a future European policy.

[PROFIL] And what about the EC? Are you considering an association treaty like Austria's?

[Nyers] We have come closer through a bilateral agreement. Membership is out of the question, but an association relationship is possible and we want to make use of this possibility to the greatest extent possible.

DIE WELT Reports Atrocities at False Border
23000106a Bonn DIE WELT in German 25 Jan 89 p 3

[Article by Wolfgang Gessler: "A False Border Lures Refugees Into a Trap"; first paragraph is DIE WELT introduction]

[Text] The Hungarian officer claimed he saw neither dead persons nor refugees with bullet wounds at the border. But the Romanian refugees who fled by the thousands to Hungary report on fatal shots at the Hungarian-Romanian border, of atrocities by the Romanian secret service. The Hungarian media disseminate these reports.

And they had hoped to be safe at long last. The march had taken 10 hours in pouring rain. The road to the border. Ten hours full of fear. Then the Romanian Ovidiu and his 2 friends stood at the border to Hungary: an unplowed and smoothed strip of land 5 meters wide. Here the fleeing are to leave behind their footprints when they turn their back on Ceausescu's hated regime and try to reach Hungary illegally. The 3 men walked side by side within visual range. They crossed 4 canals, always in icecold water up to their chest. Their boots got stuck in the putrid ground.

Ovidiu then relates what happened during an inhospitable night last December. "Suddenly the flare rose up. Behind us we heard the Romanian border soldiers shout: 'Here they are! Here! Here!' Then the submachine guns of the pursuers started to chatter. The fleeing heard the bullets hit next to them, threw themselves on the ground. The 'Hungarian border' was a sham, a trap of the Romanian border guards. 'They fired off 7 flares,' Ovidiu continued with a halting voice. 'They opened fire 7 times. It must have been 100 shots.'

The friends had sworn to themselves that there could not be any going back for them regardless of what happens. The eyes of the person I was talking to stared into space as he continued talking: "After the third hail of bullets my friend had disappeared. I have never seen him again."

The exodus of the Hungarian minority from Romania has been going on for over 2 years. The ability to endure suffering of the 2 million Transylvanian Hungarians is no longer enough to bear ethnic discriminations and economic hardship in the Romanian homeland. Whoever receives no passport, as holds true in most cases, to emigrate legally, has only the alternative of fleeing across the green border. In 1988, 6,500 Romanian citizens reached Hungary over fields and meadows in this way. In 1987 there had been only 500. Together with those who had departed legally, there are said to live in Hungary at present, depending upon source, between 30,000 and 50,000 Romanians, 90 percent of them persons of Hungarian nationality, the rest Romanian citizens of German and—a growing trend—Romanian nationality.

People escape in sealed container cases, in roof cavities and railroad refrigerator cars. Mothers feed their babies sedatives and carry them in bags across the border.

Young people play hidden tape recorders to distract the border guards, others walk backwards across the telltale smoothed strip of ground to deceive their pursuers. The Hungarian-Romanian border, 400 km long, appears to be leaky; but reports from refugees mount that many people along this border are being maltreated and murdered by Romanian border guards.

The jeep of the Hungarian border guards rumbles along through the fog between corn and grain fields. Here and there a farm, only occasionally groups of birch and poplar trees. A dreary landscape in the winter; the border area south of Oroshaza, the locality from which Col Janos Pal and his soldiers have to guard a part of the border that is 282 km long.

Beyond the locality of Battonya the tarred road narrows into a path and finally ends at a lowered barrier painted in the Hungarian national colors red, white and green. A sign is emblazoned on it bearing the inscription: "State Border of the Hungarian People's Republic. Crossing Over, Walking Across, and Talking Across Prohibited." Fifteen meters beyond that there is another barrier from which the road leads eastward into the fog and reaches the Romanian village of Turnu after 900 meters. There, at the edge of the village, Romanian guard towers, visible in outline, rise up into the sky. Between the barriers white border stones, about 50 cm high, mark the exact course of the border between the fraternal socialist states.

Colonel Pal points to a wide-meshed wire fence, 2 meters in height, which on the Romanian side runs at a varying distance of 10 to 500 meters behind the border stones, especially near localities, streets, and popular escape routes. At the place where we are it is interrupted. Pal smiles and points to the wilted plants of a corn field that extends on the Romanian side. "We suspect an observation post there," the colonel states.

This border does not frighten with its security technology know-how. It lies there quiet, almost inconspicuous. But its unpredictability makes it dangerous. Romanian authorities falsify the course of the border on official maps. To deceive the refugees, the border is imitated still on Romanian territory. To be able to apprehend them more quickly as they approach the border—it is rumored in Hungary—farms there have lately been forbidden to leave haystacks on the pastures for drying. Shelters have been torn down. Border guards on horseback, with tracker dogs and on motorcycles increasingly perform patrols.

The Romanian secret police is present everywhere, not only at the official border crossings, in the uniforms of the "regular" border officers. More and more frequently,

according to Hungarian officials, they mingle with the refugees. Romanians who were able to escape from these bloodhounds under danger of their lives feel threatened even in Budapest.

According to Hungarian border officials, the Romanian border guards bury seismographs in the ground along the border to report any vibration to the border guards. At many points trip wires are said to have been placed that trigger warning shots or flare signals when touched. However, the Romanian guard towers almost never have any searchlights. Instead their crews are said to have been equipped with highly sensitive night vision goggles.

If all that does not help, the refugees say, the Romanian border officers ruthlessly make use of their firearms. Eyewitness reports about atrocities almost never are put on the record to the Hungarian police by those affected: They are too afraid for the relatives and friends left behind in Romania.

In Budapest refugees report unanimously of cases in which persons wounded by shots were tied up to walls with arms extended and tortured with kicks. In the parsonage of the Budapest parish of Varosmajor I was shown written statements by Romanian refugees. A young woman describes there how her lower jaw was broken by rifle butt blows of Romanian border guards. "Romanian border guards who let a fleeing person escape are punished with 5-10 days in jail," an informant says. "Then they take revenge on the next Hungarian whom they catch at the border."

Doru Szovati, 23, from Romanian Timisoara, shows me in Budapest his release paper from the Oradea prison. He told me he was caught during his first attempt to escape. Before he was taken to prison he was maltreated at the border: "A Romanian officer knocked me to the ground. My hands were tied behind my back. He jumped on my ankles with his boots. He picked up an electric cable, put it around my neck and tightened it. Then he ordered a soldier to press a hot iron against my hands. The soldier refused. Then the officer left me alone."

The accounts of rapes by Romanian border officials also mount. Eye witnesses report the case of 11 Romanian female students who dared fleeing in July 1988 near Ermihelyfalva. They are said to have been raped by Romanian soldiers and then flogged. When the victims were taken to the hospital in Oradea, incensed inhabitants were said to have tried in vain to lynch those responsible. In the respected Hungarian weekly publication ELET ES IRODALOM of 25 November 1988, the Romanian writer Petru Romosan published statements of Romanian border guards with whom he had to deal during his first attempt to escape. According to their own statements, in June, July, and August 1988 Romanian border guards at the Hungarian-Romanian border had killed 200 persons and arrested 2,000. They said they had expected a "richer harvest" for the fall. Romosan

continued: "No day passes without the Romanians killing one or more persons at this border, including women and children. They beat up Hungarians because they are Hungarians and Romanians because they are Romanians."

Gruesome descriptions are circulated among refugees and in the Hungarian media about the fate of the dead. Dutch media and information from the Hungarian opposition movement, Democratic Forum, report on mass graves in the northeastern border area. Young people told the organization Church in Distress/East Priests Aid that near Romanian Oradea refugees who had been killed would be left lying in the street for days as deterrent.

The supreme commander of the Hungarian Border Troops, Janos Szekely, does not want to confirm the dreadful reports. He told DIE WELT: "We have not seen any refugee being injured or killed." He also said he had not heard anything about rapes. Deputy Interior Minister Zoltan Gal, competent for refugee questions, calls reports of discoveries of corpses in the border areas "atrocities mongering."

In Budapest, Lajos Kerenyi, a parish priest, provides religious instruction for 300 children of his parish. "The little ones always ask me why we are praying together for the refugees. Then I tell them: 'They have neither food, nor heat, nor freedom, nor light—and they are Hungarians.'"

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Direct CSSR-USSR Industrial Relations Discussed

24000084b Prague MODERNI RIZENI in Czech
Dec 88 pp 5-8

[Report: "Direct Relations in International Cooperation"]

[Text] The 44th CEMA Session in Prague (1988) evaluated the current status of international socialist cooperation, the potential for such cooperation in the member countries, and outlined a strategy for integrating research, engineering, and production. Direct relations between enterprises in the member countries was emphasized as a particularly important objective.

One of the resolutions of this CEMA session was to strengthen direct enterprise to enterprise relations. Such relationships are not a novelty in the field of international cooperation. A number of our firms currently are involved in such relationships, and have maintained them for decades now. They have been important in the resolution of many research, development, and production problems.

Direct relationships are not a new concept for us. What is new is the economic base on which they may now be developed. Enterprises are now granted the authority to enter these relationships on their own terms, without state mediation. There are only two constraints on these activities:

1. Whether or not the firm can handle it (in terms of its abilities, creativity, and material resources)
2. Whether or not it is financially capable of the relationship (capital for joint ventures).

All other constraints have been removed.

Direct relationships can be established at different levels. The simplest take the form of an agreement to exchange information and provide mutual assistance. At a higher level, R&D resources are pooled, and after the research is complete each firm can use the results as it sees fit (based on its production program). A still higher form of cooperation includes joint production and everything connected with it (research, development (i.e. preproduction), and sometimes including marketing and sales (i.e. "postproduction"). The highest form of this cooperation is the establishment of joint international enterprises. Direct relationships, in other words, evolve along a line from information exchange to direct cooperation and from cooperation to coproduction.

To date some 350 direct interenterprise relationships have been registered in our country, and 15 international firms, mainly with Soviet partners. Proposals are being drafted for direct relationships with firms of other socialist countries as well. This is not a bad start, and the

number of such firms will certainly grow rapidly. Nevertheless, we should not overestimate their weight, which amounts currently to 0.5 percent of total CSSR-USSR trade.

Many good things can be said about several of these functioning direct relationships. Our largest engineering firm, Skoda Plzen, has transformed its long standing relationship with the Soviet firm Uralmas into the international firm Skoda-Uralmas, with its headquarters in Plzen. Both partners have known each other for years, and are cooperating in both the R&D and the production areas.

Prague Ceskomoravska-Kolben-Danek (CKD) has merged its Compressors plant with a Soviet partner to form the international firm Interkompresor. The compressor units and drives produced by this firm compare well with the world state of the art. The Prague CKD Elektrotechnika plant has had a long term relationship with the Leningrad firm Elektrosila. They combined resources to develop and produce in record time world market competitive, 1,000 kilowatt heavy duty electric motors.

Olomouc Sigma has established a direct relationship with the RSFSR Academy of Community Management (the name "academy" can be deceptive; this is a design, research, production engineering, and manufacturing entity). They are jointly manufacturing products to support the ecology programs of their countries.

The Martin Heavy Engineering Plants have culminated their cooperative relationship with Soviet machinists by forming a joint construction office in Dubnice nad Vahou. This office designs and reviews designs for heavy duty construction and agricultural machinery.

Our robot manufacturer, Presov Metals Research Institute (VUKOV), has served as the foundation for the international Czech-Soviet association Interrobot, headquartered in Presov. This firm provides complete systems to customers in the USSR and the CSSR. Firms from other countries have expressed an interest in joining this cooperative effort.

Research and development is a frequent objective of direct relationships. The Nitra biotechnology laboratory and the Pardubice color laboratory are functioning as a joint venture. The Engineering Technology and Economy Research Institute (VUSTE) has a direct relationships with a similar institute, the Scientific Research Institute for Industrial Organization (NIIORGPROM), with which it is developing jointly new techniques for automating engineering work at the technical, preproduction stage, as well as the organization of the production process.

The Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences (CSAV) has 36 direct relationships currently under way with the USSR Academy of Sciences (AV USSR). These include joint research and testing of modern techniques for the thin layer coating of machinery parts to improve performance. Both institutions are also involved in creating a Soviet-Czech "innovation bank".

These examples are not exhaustive. Direct relationships are simply a new reality to which both additional enterprises and the economic entities of our country should pay increased attention. It is possible to develop these forward looking forms of international cooperation, but the problems encountered in doing so are significant. Participants in direct relationships require more help.

The most fundamental problem is that we are encouraging firms to establish direct international relationships, but the state is not organized to support this activity. The agenda currently includes a number of unresolved tasks in the currency and credit areas, commercial and civil law, and the preparation of experts to participate in these relationships.

For instance, there is a certain imbalance when a Czechoslovak and a Soviet firm establish a direct relationship. Soviet law grants its enterprises full authority to establish all kinds of direct relationships, while our firms require permission of the Federal Ministry of Foreign Trade before proceeding. There is little to be surprised at here. After all, in the past we have experienced relaxed entrepreneurship laws that were then necessary to modify. Some of our firms still propose certain direct relationships that would involve increased raw materials imports, which would put excessive pressure on domestic market relationships, etc. In clearcut situations, to be sure, the approval process can be speeded up so as not to put our firms in an unequal position.

There is frequent talk of a currency problem. How much do the partners actually bring to a joint venture, and how much do they take out of it? The uncertainty of currency relationships in many cases results in leaving this question open. The koruna and the ruble do not have the same relationship to the dollar, and this fundamental triangle cannot be resolved with simple calculations. Both countries are implementing price reform, but in their own ways, meaning that prices will soon be different, but this does not mean that they will be any nearer the dollar or any other world currency.

If two partners are discussing a direct relationship, they can come to an agreement in this area. When a US entrepreneur is negotiating with an entrepreneur from a third world country they do not look at each other's notes to see how much the other will be making on the deal. Instead, they try to make sure that each one makes something, as much as possible, and hopefully more than if they would undertake the venture alone.

Our firms usually try to avoid this by agreeing on a contractual price beforehand. This allows them to avoid many currency difficulties. But even this should not be left unattended, because weak partners make different agreements among themselves than strong partners. Instead of using a direct relationship to improve the economy, partners can inadvertently decide to accept agreements that represent a loss to their economy.

The situation becomes even more complex when the partners are from more than two countries, and multiple currencies are involved. In these cases they frequently agree to accept a particular currency as the standard (dollar, West German mark, frank, pounds, etc.), depending on where they will be doing business.

Currency problems demonstrate the importance of moving price formation in the direction of world prices. Naturally, it is impossible to dream up world prices, but such prices have their full significance when they belong to products of world class sophistication and quality. The path to effective direct relationships is, in the end, the path to world standards. Competitiveness in terms of sophistication, quality, and price (and availability) are the most important criteria of success.

There are many other problems as well. We have little experience with international socialist ownership, with international labor, with international customs, etc.

How is the owner of an international enterprise to develop a solid attitude to ownership, how should an owner help such a firm to grow? These are not insoluble problems but they are tasks that face us. Some international political and legal adjustments are needed to avoid future misunderstandings.

Issues of civil law are also important, such as the right to work, compensation, vacations, insurance, and others. For instance, when people work abroad they receive numerous supplements to their basic pay. This means, however, that labor costs rise substantially, which increases the cost of the products produced.

Experiences with international cooperation indicate that international agreements—without additional economic guarantees and the possibility to back out of them—and plan coordination are not sufficient to assure the success of direct relationships. Efforts must be made to internationalize all of economic life, to merge economic policies, currencies and money, commercial, labor, as well as criminal and civil codes.

Other matters are also important. They usually come to mind last of all, but nevertheless can either make a joint venture easier or more complicated. These considerations include mutual understanding, cultural sensitivity, knowledge of the customs and situation of the partner. These considerations are never included in contracts, but have a real impact on success nevertheless.

Knowledge of foreign languages is important here as well. Lack of language expertise draws everything else out, causes delays and misunderstandings. Our professionals absolutely must know both English and Russian if our efforts to establish international direct relationships are to make sense.

JZD AK Slusovice Sponsors 'Family Enterprises'
24000084a Slusovice NASE CESTA in Czech
21 Dec 88 p 5

[Article by Eng Josef Lizal, deputy chairman for R&D and investment development: "Small and Family Enterprises at JZD AK Slusovice"]

[Text] With the assistance of the economic principles we are applying at the JZD Agrokombinat Slusovice [JZD AK Slusovice] we are attempting to affect the future development of the agrokombinat in the broadest sense of the term. In addition to a system of self-finance (at the level of self-financing organizational units) we are also interested in further activating the entrepreneurial abilities of our cooperative members. We want to create the necessary opportunity for the development of organizational and production activities by cooperative members, devoting all possible resources to the future development of the JZD.

As of 1 January 1989, it became possible to establish small and family enterprises as an integral part of our JZD. This eliminates a fundamental problem in our economic environment and addresses an erroneous concept of the Czechoslovak economy, namely that the establishment of gargantuan firms will make it possible, through directive management, to produce all possible products. Experience has shown that this is not the case, either in terms of quantity, quality, or a desirable range of products. Mass production develops an immense inertia and is incapable of reacting flexibly to market demands. Therefore, when one speaks of maximum satisfaction of the requirements of daily life, one is making only formalistic statements.

By permitting the formation of small and family enterprises at our JZD we intend to organize production activities and to produce products that are not available on the domestic market and which our major production programs are not designed to manufacture. This will also allow us to make better use of peripheral materials, waste raw materials, excess materials, production space and machinery either right at the JZD or in its vicinity. The main objective, however, is to enable as many as possible of our members to make productive use of their abilities, ideas, and organizational talents. On a world scale, after all, small firms and enterprises are a common and essential occurrence. If we had to cite an example we need look no further than at well known producers from Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea which are now

flooding world markets with goods from small workshops and factories. Even automobiles could not get by without such manufacturers, because large plants cannot produce components worth a few crowns or halers.

There is a place for this type of factory right here.

The small and family enterprises of the JZD AK Slusovice are part of the cooperative, have full operating independence, and function on the basis of self-finance. They will be established on a completely voluntary principle and with individual resources. Potential entrepreneurs will have to provide their own financial and production resources and working capital.

If one of these operations is engaged in plant or livestock production it can expect appropriate material assistance from the JZD, in the form of loans for machinery, equipment, and in some cases land.

Any member of the JZD AK Slusovice can apply to establish a small enterprise. The application will be submitted to the economic department which will submit it to management. The economics department will establish economic regulations and relationships, and set up an account for the small enterprise at the JZD internal enterprise bank.

The JZD management must approve the application. At the same time it approves the objective of the enterprise, which must be in accordance with an approved activity of the JZD AK as registered with the district national committee. In practical terms this means that not every activity can be undertaken by a small or family enterprise.

A small enterprise may have one to ten employees. The plant manager—operator—must be a member of the JZD, but any remaining employees can be, but do not have to be JZD members. Other employees can be family members, or non-JZD members who have signed a work agreement with the JZD AK.

Cooperative members with a permanent working relationship with the JZD may work in a small enterprise. The work that such an individual performs at a small enterprise, however, cannot be the same work that he or she performs on the JZD. Work for the small enterprise also must not interfere with work performance on a JZD job.

Types of Activity

There are three possible types of enterprise, based on type of production.

Category I. Livestock production, plant production, fruit and vegetable production, production of foodstuffs, provision of services, including construction.

Category II. Machinery production, forest product production, products from agricultural chemistry or biochemistry, production and assembly of instruments and microelectronic items.

Category III. Other production and nonproduction activity, with emphasis on research and development, developing technical procedures, production programs, design and engineering activities.

Organization and Management

Small enterprises have full operating independence. The operators themselves determine what they want to do, set up their own place of work, and handle production themselves. They establish labor force utilization, hours of work, and form of compensation. They are, in other words, entrepreneurs in the true sense of the word. No one can interfere in their activities.

Materials and raw materials can be purchased at retail or ordered through the commercial divisions of JZD microstructures. As a rule such orders will be placed with divisions with which the entrepreneur is already cooperating. Small enterprise operators also have the right to purchase rejected materials, waste materials, or excess materials from the JZD.

Based on official approval to set up a small enterprise, the operator signs an agreement or contract with a factory or division of the JZD AK Slusovice to which or through which he or she will sell its output. This contract can also be signed with a specialized, small enterprise operation, that will be organized within the microstructure of strategic development. A small enterprise operation will assist in the activities of small and family enterprises, cooperate with them in searching for and developing production programs, offer pricing consultation, handle legal requirements and manage the approval and testing process for new products.

Economic Regulations and Management

Economic regulations make full use of the principle of self-finance. Operators invest the financial resources (initial capital) for their operations from their own resources. The small enterprise is responsible for all material and overhead costs connected with production, transportation, handling and the sale of its products.

Revenues and profit form the basis for distributing the financial yield from a small enterprise. Such enterprises must pay the following amounts to the JZD.

Income Taxes

Taxes on the revenues of a small enterprise depend on the category to which the enterprise has been assigned.

The following table lists percentage taxes on revenue, by category:

Category I—no taxes;

Category II—20 percent tax;

Category III—50 percent tax.

Taxes on Wages

Set as a percentage of total wages paid, and in relation to total profits generated.

Payments can be made by check using a branch of the internal enterprise bank. The sale and invoicing of products, produce, and services of small and family enterprises must be made exclusively within or through the JZD AK Slusovice.

Closing of Small and Family Enterprises

A small or family enterprise may be closed upon mutual agreement between the operator and the JZD AK Slusovice.

Other reasons for closing such an enterprise include failure to comply with established operating procedures, long term losses from operations, and the direct sale of products and goods to customers other than the JZD AK Slusovice.

The operator is responsible for any demonstrated damages or losses. When a small enterprise closes, cooperative members may continue to be employed at the JZD at a corresponding job classification.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Forests Increasingly Damaged by Pollution

23000094 Bonn INFORMATIONEN in German
23 Dec 88 pp 4-5

[Report: "'Rapid Increase' in Forest Damage in the GDR"]

[Text] The GDR has for the first time released precise figures about the number of trees which have been damaged by environmental pollution in the GDR. According to the STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE GDR 1988, 37 percent of the forest area of the GDR (998,000 hectares) has been damaged by environmental pollution. Spruce trees have been the hardest hit with a 42.5 percent rate of damage. Pines have been damaged 40.4 percent. GDR statistics indicate that the situation is better in the case of deciduous trees. Only 14.3 percent of the oaks and 12.2 percent of the beech trees have been affected. All in all, in the words of Deputy Minister for Agriculture, Forestry and Foodstuffs Rudolf Ruethnick, an "extremely rapid increase" in new kinds of forest damage has been detected, caused primarily by nitrogen oxides, soil acidity and an "insufficient supply" of magnesium, calcium, lime and phosphorous for the trees. According to Ruethnick, "large

areas of spruce forest in Thuringia, the western Erzgebirge, Vogtland and the Harz Mountains" have been affected. Ruethnick, whose speech to this year's annual meeting of the Forestry Industry of the GDR has now been published in the journal *SOZIALISTISCHE FORSTWIRTSCHAFT* (No. 11, 1988), called upon those working in this field to pay greater attention to "rapidly increasing pollution," in particular because, in addition to sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide, "seven pollutants have currently been determined to have an effect on the GDR." As possible solutions, Ruethnick suggested intensified cultivation of "smoke-resistant trees" and increased airborne fertilization.

HUNGARY

Public Satisfaction With Social Services Analyzed
25000079a Budapest *MAGYAR NEMZET*
in Hungarian 20 Dec 88 p 7

[Article by Judit Lendvay, sociologist on the Hungarian Public Opinion Research Institute staff: "Social Policy and Public Opinion"]

[Text] In the spring of 1988, the Hungarian Public Opinion Research Institute held a survey of how people rated social services, and welfare assistance for the needy. The questionnaire survey was conducted by interviewing 1,000 persons, a representative sample of Hungary's adult population.

According to the respondents, social services were mediocre on average. This was the rating given health-care services (district dispensaries, outpatient clinics, and hospitals), education-related services that have become institutionalized (daytime homes for pupils, student dormitories, and organized summer vacations for schoolchildren), and services providing full or part-time accommodations (old-age homes, day-care centers for the elderly, and workers' hostels). Day nurseries and kindergartens fared better: these two services were rated "good" on average.

Degree of Satisfaction in Provinces Higher

The respondents expressed their satisfaction—which meant a rating of "good" or "very good"—usually with four or five out of the types of services listed. Satisfaction was voiced most frequently with the kindergartens, day nurseries, day-care centers for the elderly, and old-age homes. (Two-thirds of the respondents expressed satisfaction with the kindergartens and day nurseries; and about half, with the day-care centers for the elderly and the old-age homes.) We found significant dissatisfaction with only one type of service: the workers' hostels were criticized the most often (by 40 percent of the respondents).

The day nurseries' standing in the ratings sweepstakes improved, even though the ratings of individual types of social services declined in comparison with the past: All

the listed types of social services, except daytime homes for pupils and organized summer vacations for schoolchildren, had been rated "good" in the early 1980's, whereas now only the day nurseries and the kindergartens received this rating.

The most important factors that determined general satisfaction were the respondents' educational background and place of residence. As a rule, the respondents with less formal education and from the provinces were better satisfied with the listed social services than the respondents with more formal education and the ones from Budapest. In a breakdown by levels of formal education, the number of services with which the respondents generally claimed to be satisfied developed as follows: five grades or less, eight services; six or seven grades, six services; eight grades, five services; secondary school graduates, four or five services; and college or university graduates, three services. The differences by types of settlements were not so pronounced, but were significant nonetheless. The rating of social services changed along the Budapest-provincial dividing line: on average, the Budapest respondents were satisfied with three or four services; while the respondents from small towns and villages were satisfied with five services.

Our analyses show that satisfaction with the system of social services was the greatest specifically among the people who, because of their social status and circumstances, were the most dependent on using the individual types of services; in other words, among the people who could least afford alternative services.

In a breakdown by levels of formal education, the proportion of respondents satisfied with health-care services developed as follows: five grades or less, 76 percent; six or seven grades, 57 percent; eight grades, 41 percent; secondary school graduates, 33 percent; and college or university graduates, 26 percent. Especially unfavorable was the rating that college or university graduates gave the hospitals: only 14 percent felt that hospital care was "good" or "very good." In a breakdown by age, we found the most significant differences in the rating of the district dispensaries among the health-care services: 26 percent of the young respondents, 34 percent of the middle-aged respondents, and 59 percent of the elderly respondents (those over 60) expressed satisfaction with the district dispensaries.

The respondents' sex was the only significant factor that influenced their rating of the day nurseries and kindergartens: the generally favorable rating of these services tended to be even more favorable among the female respondents.

With a rise in the respondents' educational level, satisfaction with the daytime homes for pupils and the student dormitories declined once again, and criticism of these services intensified: 68 percent of the respondents with at most seven grades of formal education, 42 percent of the respondents who finished the eighth grade,

30 percent of the secondary school graduates, and 18 percent of the college or university graduates were satisfied with the daytime homes for pupils. Satisfaction with the student dormitories dropped from 66 to 30 percent of the respondents as their educational level rose. Primarily the respondents' financial situation influenced their rating of organized summer vacations for schoolchildren: the well-to-do respondents were less satisfied with this service than the respondents of more modest means were.

Undeserving Welfare Recipients

In addition to the respondents' educational level, also their age and place of residence influenced their satisfaction with the services that provide accommodations. In line with the pattern established above, the best educated respondents were the least satisfied with the services that the old-age homes, workers' hostels and day-care centers for the elderly provide; but the proportion of the satisfied respondents rose with their rising age and with their declining degree of urbanization. Somewhat in conflict with the expectations was the favorable rating of the old-age homes by the respondents who were over 60; presumably this can be attributed to the mere existence of such institutions.

Thus the most satisfied were the social and demographic groups most often forced to avail themselves of the social services and unable to afford alternative services. Their satisfaction can be attributed not only to the simple fact of their reliance, but in all likelihood also to the absence of any significant difference between the quality of the social services and the living standards of the disadvantaged social and demographic strata. In some instances, the social services are probably better than the care the recipients would have at home. Another factor explaining the satisfaction of these strata is that a critical attitude is less common among them than among people of higher social status.

Our earlier surveys likewise led to the conclusion that persons living in more favorable circumstances tend to be considerably less satisfied with how the social services operate. This is explained, among other things, by differences in the levels of the individual groups' expectations, and in the extent to which the individual groups are personally affected.

Closely linked to the system of social services is also the system of welfare assistance for the needy.

The majority (62 percent) of the respondents felt that some of the welfare clients today did not deserve public assistance.

The most frequently mentioned social groups or subcultures were: the Gypsies (by 40 percent of the respondents); the work-shy, drunkards, vagrants, criminals, and hooligans, i.e., persons without any visible means of

support (26 percent); the people who have good connections, enjoy privileges and "sit close to the fire" (24 percent); people who are well off and do not need welfare assistance (13 percent); and finally the persons whom their families or children could support but pass on this burden to the state (2 percent).

In comparison with the early 1980's, there was an increase (from 58 percent) in the proportion of respondents who felt that some welfare clients did not deserve welfare assistance. A significant change was that far more respondents mentioned the Gypsies as undeserving welfare clients (the proportion of such respondents increased to 40 percent, from 27 percent a few years earlier).

State Aid, Personal Diligence

The majority (72 percent) of the respondents felt that some people who deserved welfare assistance were not getting any. The most frequently mentioned social categories were the following: the elderly, persons who retired long ago, retirees receiving small pensions, and elder persons living alone or without relatives (by 54 percent of the recipients); large families (25 percent); the chronically sick, physically handicapped, and completely or partially disabled (19 percent); those who are unaware of their need (13 percent); single parents (7 percent); young people at the start of their careers, and newlyweds (5 percent); and the poor (3 percent).

According to 6 percent of the respondents, they themselves or their families should have been receiving welfare assistance.

In 1982, 61 percent of the respondents felt that some deserving needy people were not getting welfare assistance. The proportion of respondents mentioning the individual groups has increased since then for every group, with large families showing the largest increase in its proportion of respondents.

Thus a substantial majority of the respondents knew of the state's welfare activity, but the proportions mentioned above suggest that the population does not regard as suitable the system for disbursing welfare assistance: the general view emerged that many undeserving welfare clients were getting welfare assistance, which left nothing for the truly needy.

An indication of reservations about welfare assistance is also the finding that, in the opinion of the respondents, primarily good job opportunities and personal diligence, rather than state assistance, could alleviate the lot of persons living in adverse conditions. The upgrading of skills and household thrift were mentioned respectively as the third and fourth most important factors. But state subsidies and favorable state loans ranked last and next to last respectively, which indicated that the majority of the respondents considered the more indirect forms of assistance and the individual's determination (diligence and thrift) to improve his own lot as more effective than state welfare assistance.

The respondents rated as decidedly serious the situation of the chronically ill, and of the elderly living alone (with 65 and 61 percent respectively mentioning these two groups), as well as the situation of the physically handicapped and

disabled, and of the large families (mentioned by 56 and 48 percent respectively). These are the social groups which, in the opinion of the survey's participants, need state assistance the most.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Demographic Study Views Policy Aimed at Higher Birthrate

23000104 East Berlin

WIRTSCHAFTSWISSENSCHAFT in German

Vol 37 No 1, Jan 89 pp 19-33

[Article by Wulfram Speigner, Dr of Economics, born 1940, department head at the Institute for Sociology and Social Policy, GDR Academy of Sciences: "Birth-Promoting Policies in the GDR in the 1980's"; tables mentioned in article not reproduced]

[Text] Political action has population policy effects in every society, in every historical situation. But population policy action becomes purposeful whenever population size, regional distribution and structures become important to the social, economic and military interests of the state or, more precisely, to the interests of the ruling classes and their representatives. This is the case today in almost all countries of the world and has had a long tradition in most of them, whereby the focal points, the proceeding and the effects result, generally speaking, from socioeconomic conditions, the situation of society, and the possibilities of political action. As in many other countries, in the GDR, also, no politically thinking person is any longer indifferent to demographic processes.

Orientations of Population Policy in the GDR

How demographic policy action influences the reproduction of the populace results from the fundamental orientations of social policy. In the GDR, "the major task in molding developed socialist society" consists "in further increasing the people's material and cultural standard of living on the basis of a high development pace of socialist production, increase in effectiveness, scientific-technical progress, and growth of work productivity."¹

Social policy serves to satisfy the material and cultural-intellectual needs of people. This goal is implemented through a foreign policy directed at preservation of peace, a domestic policy safeguarding basic human rights, an economic and social policy guaranteeing social security, and many other political activities. In this ensemble of political areas, one can define population policy as the direct influence on the behavior of people for changing demographic processes. It is a system of goal-settings and measures by state institutions and social organizations for influencing fertility (frequency of births), migration (internal and external), and mortality. It influences population size, its distributions and structures by contributing to changing these demographic processes. In the last analysis, it is a result of the behavior of the people who are a part of that population. Thus population policy always has as its object the reproductive behavior, change of place of residence (migration behavior), morbidity and mortality.

Ultimately, population policy is directed at the accordance of socioeconomic development and demographic processes in the interest of the individual, his family and all of society.

Population policy in the GDR is considered a part of social policy. This derives from the understanding of the character of Marxist-Leninist social policy: It "is the totality of measures and methods...for shaping social conditions."² Therefore it is understood as a highly complex political area which exerts influence on all aspects of "raising the standard of living of the classes, strata and social groups, and shaping the socialist way of life."³ That also concerns the living conditions and ways of thinking of people which codetermine their demographically relevant behavior. Population policy goals and measures are social policy ones. Population policy is based on the premise that a rising standard of living, together with the guarantee of social security for all citizens, members of all classes, strata and social groups, is the precondition for demographic development. Population policy is thus implemented on the basis of the unity of economic and social development. Measures to raise the standard of living of the entire people serve this purpose as well as specific social policy measures for the promotion, support and care of special groups of citizens. These are material, legal, and ideological-instructive measures and means.

Such an orientation does not only concern population policy itself. It also applies to political areas which have more or less population policy aspects, such as external migration policy, health, family and housing policies. Population policy is always jointly effective with measures (or omissions) in these areas. For that very reason it is hardly possible to determine exclusively population policy goals, measures, means and effects.

Taking into account these joint effects of various political areas, particularly areas of social policy, one can state that at present the following population policy orientations exist in the GDR:

—Population policy directed at fertility is need-oriented and aimed at higher birthrates. The most important aim of socialist society in the GDR in the field of birth development is that young people can fulfill their wish to have children. Every woman, every family is to have the chance to bring into this world as many children as they want and when they want, and to live with these children in a happy family. In the young generation, particularly among women, fundamental changes in their needs have occurred in the past decades. Population policy is also based on these needs. It aims primarily at making it easier for young women and men to dovetail these needs. That requires above all that possibilities are created for women to simultaneously fulfill their need for children and avail themselves of their right to work and education. To formulate it under a different aspect: It is thereby made easier for young women and their partners to completely fulfill their wish for children and to

combine motherhood or parenthood, respectively, with a career. For that reason, this policy is need-oriented. In the area of birth development, society's interest also consists in generally [providing] replacements for the parent generations, so that families with two or three children are the rule. It is considered one of the long-term goals to again reach the level of simple reproduction (since 1972, fertility is lower than required for a net reproduction rate of 1.0).

—Population policy to influence internal migration is aimed at satisfying the needs of social and economic development of the whole country in accordance with the citizens' right to free selection of a place of residence. The present territorial distribution of the populace in the GDR corresponds to these requirements overall. Internal migration (migrating beyond kreis boundaries per year) is relatively low with about 2 percent. But it also continues to be necessary. Naturally, it takes place according to the individual decisions of the people concerned. According to plan, they are influenced by the development of working and living conditions—on the one hand, in the target areas of internal migration (for example, the capital city of Berlin), and, on the other, in areas where migration losses are to be avoided (for example, in rural communities and small towns).

As in almost all countries of the world, external migration is of importance to the GDR, also. It applies primarily to the time-limited use of qualified personnel or learners and students, respectively, and to uniting families.

—The population policy directed at morbidity and mortality aims at the greatest possible reduction of illness and mortality. Preservation, promotion and restoration of health and enjoyment of life are among the defined goals of health and population policy. In the perfecting of medical care in the GDR, basic medical care is the central point. It comprises all services in prophylaxis, diagnostics, therapy and rehabilitation. This is in accordance with the recommendations of the World Health Organization (WHO) and the International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) regarding their agreed-upon goal-settings on basic health care, which are summarized in the slogan "Health for All by the Year 2000." But in lowering morbidity and raising life expectancy it is also always a matter of combining a meaningful life with social security in old age, with health and physical and mental well-being in all phases of life, so that both length of life and productive age are increased.

These orientations are predicated upon economic and social processes, but naturally also on the determining relations between the individual demographic processes on which population prognoses, for instance, must be based. It is a particular problem to correspond to present as well as future interests of society. Decisions in the population policy field in general have effects which

reach far beyond the periods of economic planning. They must always implement the unity of goals to be attained in the long term with present societal and individual interests. If this does not succeed, contradictions between such interests are inevitable.

Population Policy and Fertility

Policies designed to promote higher birthrates are ultimately aimed at influencing the size and structures of the populace and thus, expressed more concretely, at growth intensity, birthrate, replacement of the parent generation. But these data are only the "strategic goal components" of this policy.⁴ Its object are the social processes of the development of fertility and births. It concerns the birthrates of women of a fertile age, the average number of children in families, fertility in and out of wedlock. In this one must also distinguish the object of population policy influence, since the measures to be taken aim at the reproductive behavior of people, the result of which are demographic processes. Population policy consists in changing societal living conditions and values. Behavior is confrontation with these living conditions and values. Mediating links between them and reproductive behavior are the needs, value orientations and individual living conditions of people. Let us call these three data the triad of behavioral factors.⁵ And these very same constitute the subject area of population policy. It consists in the frame of relations between the demographic behavior of people and societal material and ideological conditions. It is necessary to distinguish thus between strategic goal components, object and subject of birth-promoting population policy, since only in this manner does it become clear how population policy measures work, which measures can be suitable, and how effective they are.

It is one of the great [measures of] progress in the way of life in the GDR that a woman (and her partner) has the opportunity to decide herself on the number and the timing of the birth of her children. How many children a woman will bear, and the average number of children in a family—that may ultimately depend on the decisions of a woman. From this results, however, that birth-promoting population policy can influence its object only indirectly, namely, by changing their decisions through influencing the needs, value orientations and living conditions of young people. Of course, measures for changing the object directly would be possible, for instance through administrative regulations of family planning, i.e., through prohibiting termination of pregnancies in particular. But such measures are not being taken in the GDR where the person's right to freedom of decision is the starting point of population policy and therefore do not have to be considered here. For this very reason it is necessary to emphasize so strongly these behavioral factors of population policy.

Let us look more closely at how the triad of factors influences behavior or, in other words, how the process of social influence on behavior takes its course: Like every type of human behavior, the reproductive one also is governed directly by "ideal powers" (Engels). How do

they come about under the influence of societal living conditions and values, thus also of population policy measures, and how are they to be described?⁶

In Marxist opinion, the life process of the personality is constant activity in order to satisfy its individual needs. Reproductive behavior is predicated upon the social need to have children; it must be defined as the need to beget and give birth to children and to live with them in a family and, as a rule, is closely linked to the sexual need, whereby both exist simultaneously (at least temporarily) for the individual. The social need exists on the basis of its societal character in a concrete-historical form, i.e., on the one hand it has a specific qualitative basis corresponding to the way of life, resulting essentially from the role of the child in the family and the type of partner relationships and, on the other hand, it is directed at a certain number of children in the family. Empirically, the "productive" need to have children is expressed in the actual wish for children.

A pattern of behavior such as the reproductive one is a resultant of the overall need structure of man. Not one need, but at least several of this structure effect an activity. And this need structure never creates only one, but always—and almost simultaneously—the necessity for several, as a rule different, activities. The broader the need structure, i.e., the farther the personality is developed, the more varied are the activities. With the implementation of equal rights, women are developing a need structure which, in addition to the need to have children, includes:

- the need to work and to affirm oneself in a career,
- the need for a harmonious family life,
- the need to attain a high standard of living,
- the need for education and cultural values.

A social policy concept of a woman's choice between children/household or career/societal engagement would contradict such a need structure. Population policy must be based on the premise that women want to bear their children when it seems compatible with their training, choice of a partner, and career. In 1987, a representative sociological survey was carried out in the GDR (to be called in the following, wish-for-children 87). Table 1 (appendix) shows how high the wish for children is among women and men between the ages of 18 and 40. It confirms the tendency found in many similar studies that the wish for children is formed quite concretely and relatively early (during 18 to 20 years of age), and is oriented toward two children for the majority of young people. The number of children wanted on an average has been stable for a number of years (on the average, 1.9 children for both women and men). Between social groups, also, there remains only a slight difference in the wish for children. The motivation of the decision to give

birth to children is ever more strongly determined by the awareness that children are an indispensable content of life, a joint task for parents, and thus part of personality development.

This need to have children does not determine reproductive behavior directly, but is imparted. The individual's interests play a particular role in this. They are expressed in a person's value orientations, the stable, concrete regulators of social behavior. The variety of man's need structure is closely linked to his structure of value orientations. In our time, the child is determinant in men's value orientations directed at the family. On the one hand, woman and man thus react spiritually to the high demands of child rearing; on the other hand, it is also an expression of changed family functions. We can speak of a central position of the child in the family. Young women and men place very great importance on their family, life with children, and the stability of partner relationships. To have children is a general value—only very few young people (about 1 percent) consider it ideal not to have children. There is also the firm conviction that life with a partner is an indispensable part of life—99 percent of women and 96 percent of men want to live in stable partner relationships.

The subjective factors of reproductive behavior (needs and value orientations), in the reproductive as in any behavior, are in relation to the objective, individual/family living conditions of a person: Reproductive behavior is prepared and carried out on the basis of these objective, individual conditions. They set the limit within which the possibilities of action become reality—they form the subjective factors and are shaped by man, as far as it is possible for him, according to his "inner scale." Of the totality of these living conditions, the following are codeterminants for reproductive behavior as a specific social behavior pattern: stability of partner relationships; employment and working conditions; housing conditions of the family, present and to be expected after giving birth; relations in the family's social strata; funds for individual/family consumption; the family's anticipated financial situation; social child care; time available for activities with the children, child rearing and care.

This is only a listing in sequence, not a ranking. Studies point up that, for example, the time that men and women have available for their children is not of subordinate, but rather of very great importance. Ninety percent of women are convinced that they can combine several children with their job, and for 96 percent of women, a family with several children corresponds better to the idea of a happy family life than a family with an only child.

Behavior, in a complicated psychic process, springs from a decisionmaking process which cannot be described here.⁷ Only as a thesis it is to be stated here: The wish for a child, in the decision to carry a pregnancy to full term, that is to say, the birth of the first or another child,

becomes the source of behavioral impulses. Under the effect of value orientations, it is connected up to the objective factors and the desired result (the birth of a child, and life with him). It is evident that a person does not allow its action to be determined simply by having the wish for a child fulfilled, but also considers the conditions of this fulfillment. In this decisionmaking process expectations are created with regard to living conditions, and ultimately a certain willingness to act, with a motivation, is created. This motivation is the totality of the directly working impulses; it gives intensity and direction to the activity.

The type of willingness to act is transformed into actual behavior, whereby the subjective factors, actualized by motivation, "drive" man to action on the basis of living conditions, material conditions and social relations, as well as his physical and psychological traits. In this sense, there exists freedom of decision and freedom of action of the individual in his reproductive behavior. Insofar as the way of life, societal conditions and values, connecting links, needs, value orientations and individual/family living conditions influence the creation of a certain willingness to act, individual action is steered socially. The individual, "subjectively free" decision is made under the influence of external devices regulating action.

As a result of family behavior in the social groups, a birth development is created in dependence on socioeconomic conditions. The great variety of material and ideological societal circumstances also determines the demographic ones which are a part of them. Population policy measures intervene in this complex structure of behavioral factors by influencing the living conditions and values of society.⁸ But this becomes effective only if individual decisions by young people are changed lastingly. For this reason it is so important to distinguish between goal components, objects and the subject of population policy.

Analysis of the Effect of Birth-Promoting Policy in the GDR

A successful population policy requires the effect analysis of purposeful measures and other social changes. This, of course, is true for all areas of social policy. But this "effect analysis" task as a rule is not clearly defined and carried out. It is unsatisfactory that effect analysis plays such a minor role in discussions on social policy orientations. Whoever carries out social policy actions must ascertain the effectiveness of his activities. Only he who carries out effect analyses which are sufficiently oriented with regard to content and method creates scientific prerequisites for successful further social policy activities. For instance, it is not enough to list measures such as the number of apartments built or reconstructed, pension increases and financial support for families—it is also always necessary to estimate how they have changed the standard of living, and ultimately the thinking and behavior patterns of the recipients.

For this reason, demographers for a long time have been concerned with appraising the effects of population policy which, as a rule, also entails a critical assessment of the methodology of such appraisals. In recent times, A. Klinger (Hungarian People's Republic) made an essential contribution to this.⁹ In principle, four problems must be solved in these analyses of the effect of population policy:

- Population policy measures require a definition of goal intents if their effect is to be assessed. As a rule, they are not the subject of political expressions of will in decreeing measures, but almost always result from the scientific understanding of the goals of population policy;
- In their totality affect (more or less) the behavior of people. In general, the effect of individual measures cannot be appraised;
- As a rule work as a part of comprehensive social policy changes. What effect they have is difficult to appraise, isolated from the overall development;
- As a rule do not aim directly at changing fertility (or mortality, or migration behavior, respectively), but rather at the development of living conditions, needs and value orientations of people. Therefore, demographic analysis must be complemented by analyses of other disciplines, particularly sociology.

It is obvious that, for instance, the effects of birth-promoting population policy cannot be ascertained on the basis of birth figures and birthrates, since they are influenced by structural effects. Not infrequently, however, and probably because of the complicated nature of the subject, one falls back on the appraisal of changes in fertility as the most important criterion.¹⁰ As a rule, that is only one of the indicators.

It was stated above that the following goals exist for birth-promoting population policy of the GDR:

- It should be easier for young people to fulfill their wish for a child.
- Motherhood/parenthood should be combined with employment.
- Simple reproduction of the populace should be a long-term goal.

It results from the conclusions on the subject of population policy that not only demographic and other indices can be taken into account, but that, in addition, it must be taken into consideration how young people themselves think about the effect of population policy measures and the conditions of fulfilling their wish for children, i.e., the demographic climate must be included

in the analysis. Taking into account the aforementioned goal intents, it is attempted in the following to appraise the effect of the birth-promoting population policy in the GDR.

On Fulfilling the Wish To Have Children

Table 1 presented the actual wish for children as it resulted from sociological studies. How it is being fulfilled is shown by two indices: the rate of motherhood, and final fertility attained.

A striking characteristic of analyses of the wish for children in the GDR is the fact that very few young people do not want to have children. This points to a very high rate of motherhood and fatherhood (share of women or men, respectively, who in the course of their lives bear or beget, respectively, at least one child). Up to now, this index has been seldom used in demography. Thereby, however, an important social factor, the extent of (voluntary or involuntary) childlessness, is being ignored. This aspect is glossed over in the usual macro-analytical fertility analysis with period fertility figures and the like. The following development in rate of motherhood was ascertained in the GDR:

While approximately 20 percent of women born at the beginning of this century remained childless, this share was about 11 percent for women born in 1934 (fertile phase approximately between 1950 and 1980). But the share of childless women dropped even further: At the 1981 census, the share of [childless] women born in 1941 was 9.2 percent, that of women born in 1946 only 7.7 percent. This is all the more remarkable if one considers that the biological lower limit stands at about 5 percent of women of the same age group. If one takes the last age groups who ended their fertile phase in the mid-1980's, then the rate of motherhood was approximately 90 percent on an average (Table 2). This very high rate of motherhood is a part of the change of the way of life. Its increase has many causes:

- Living conditions of women and their families have developed in such a way that motherhood and career are basically compatible and are also seen as compatible, without overlooking concrete problems.
- Social security is guaranteed in the GDR and has become a matter of course. Young families do not have to fear that the birth of a child will cause great financial problems, that women will lose their jobs; they know that their children will get a good education and that youth unemployment will not occur in the GDR.
- Having children is a tradition in the GDR which is being continued by the adolescent generation.
- With the development of health care, marital sterility has been reduced.

—In the age groups which are now at age 42, there is a surplus of men. Almost every woman can find a permanent partner if she wants to implement her wish for a child.

In many areas, social policy has contributed to creating these preconditions for a high rate of motherhood. Under these conditions, voluntary childlessness is a determining situation of life for only a relatively small part of young women in the GDR.

Not only the rate of motherhood among marrieds rose strongly, but also that of singles (Table 2). Today it is possible for every woman to satisfy her wish for children, independent of whether she wants to be married to the father of her children. That is primarily a result of woman's changed position in society, but also a result of determined, effective social policy which takes into account the needs of young people. It was, and is, necessary to improve the living conditions of single mothers. This contributed to the fact that, in the past 15 years, the share of children born out of wedlock rose from 15 to about 33 percent. That holds true in particular for firstborn children. It is a matter of course that young couples who share life companionship make use of these social policy regulations in favor of single mothers.

But, naturally, single women have a considerably lower rate of motherhood than married ones. The increase of the share of single women leads to a reduction of the average rate of motherhood.

Final fertility can be assessed according to the average number of children per individual age groups, and it is justified to include age groups as of 30 years of age. That is possible on the basis of the census of 31 December 1981 counting people, occupations, housing and buildings (VBWGZ 81) (Table 3). But sociological surveys also provide an appropriate picture.

The statement that, on the average, about 1.9 children per woman are born (Table 4) simply expresses that the wish for children is generally being satisfied. That is one, albeit not yet adequate, conclusion with regard to the effect of population policy measures. Cohort comparisons provide further information. Table 3 shows the estimated fertility of women born between 1942 and 1957. There is a noticeable increase for women born as of 1951. Without a doubt, that is also an effect of determined population policy.

The sequence of order attained in final fertility offers a further indication for appraising the effectiveness of population policy measures if one compares it to the wish for children. That is possible through such representative analyses as the 1987 analysis of the wish for children (Table 5). In the two age groups in the fourth decade of life, about 70 percent of those questioned fulfilled their wish for children. Purposeful population policy has contributed to this degree of accordance.

On the Compatibility of Motherhood/Parenthood and Career

Employment of young mothers is a matter of course in the GDR. In the wish-for-children analysis 87 it was found that only 1.7 percent of mothers between the ages of 18 to 40 do not hold a job. Many of them (about 20 percent) work shorter hours, however, and relatively many of them also point out that in their professional development they stepped back in favor of the children.

In principle it can be stated that the social policy situation makes life with children in the family easier and thereby makes a significant contribution to satisfying the totality of needs. As a trend that holds true for all social classes, strata and groups in the GDR. Thus the following course of fertility development is empirically assured: Societal living conditions and values, in a relatively long-lasting process, become the precondition for social groups to shape demographic behavior patterns which are about identical. The formerly very noticeable differences between the wish for children as well as the number of children in the families of different social groups have been largely eliminated.

This situation is expressed in the demographic climate. The latter means the atmosphere in a society with regard to the birth of children as well as living with them in the family. It appears in the most varied forms in everyday awareness, in moods, in emotions. Ultimately it shows to what extent a society is fond of children in life, not only in its demands. All in all, it exists in the same way in the various social groups in the GDR.

The demographic climate is determined by the conviction that young families with children live in social security in the GDR. More than 95 percent of women and 93 percent of men are convinced that in the GDR, social security has been comprehensively or essentially implemented, and the overwhelming majority also see their children's future as secure.¹¹ Population policy measures are judged on this basis:

- Almost all young women and men state that these measures ease life with children in the family.
- Ninety-six percent of them state that society effectively supports families.
- Seventy-three percent of women (64 percent of men) think that the standard of living attained makes it possible for families to have as many children as they want.
- Many young people, however, also see problems in fully satisfying their wish for children. Almost always they foresee considerable changes in their material conditions if they have another child. These are primarily housing problems.

The social and population policy measures have had a favorable effect on the demographic climate. Particularly appreciated by young women and men is the combination of financial and time measures. The baby year, shortened working hours, increased children's allowances, paid leave in case of ill children, and improved medical care are stressed as being particularly favorable.

For the majority of those questioned, there is no direct influence of social policy measures on the number of children born; 6 percent of women and 5 percent of men have increased their wish for children because of these measures. The majority of those questioned see such an influence in favor of full satisfaction of the wish for children and, after only a few years, consider social policy measures a "quite normal component of living conditions." That corresponds to a reality observed in many countries: After about 2 or 3 years, even comprehensive population policy measures lose their additional stimulating effect.

So far, the population policy measures in the GDR have not led to an increased wish for children. That, however, is also not one of their direct goals. Sociological studies show that the wish for children is stable. A large part of young women and men do not see in the totality of their living conditions a sufficient prerequisite to have two or three children as well as have a great commitment to job performance, and to have adequate opportunities for all-around personality development. Therefore, under present objective and subjective conditions it cannot be expected that the wish for children will be oriented toward an average number of children in the families which would guarantee full replacement of the parent generation.

On the Fertility Trend and Replacement of the Parent Generation

It can be expected that the level of fertility now attained in the GDR will essentially continue in the coming years. No considerable decline is anticipated due to the stable wish for families with two children, the attitude that this wish can be fulfilled, and the high rate of motherhood. However, an increase in fertility under present conditions is also not to be expected. Stable fertility will, however, lead to a decline in birth figures in the coming years since the number of women of an age of greatest fertility (21 to 24 years) continues to decline. Simple reproduction of the population will not be achieved in the foreseeable future.

If one proceeds from the sum of age-specific fertility figures, those born in 1937 were so far the last to ensure simple reproduction (sum of fertility figures, 2,134); for married women it was those born in 1941 (2,148). Since the beginning of the 1980s, fertility is about 15 to 20 percent below the replacement level (Table 6). However, at present it is not absolutely possible to appraise the effect of the population policy programs of the years

1976/1984/1986 on fertility. That requires comparison of the final fertility of all the age groups included, with those not taken into account.

But a fertility analysis cannot provide an appraisal of the effect of population policy on its strategic goal components. For that it is necessary to establish the actual replacement of the parent generation. That is possible only if the absolute size of the first generation (children and adolescent generation) is compared with that of the second generation (parent generation) of the populace.¹² Table 7 shows the ratio of the two generations from 1971 to 2030. In 1971, this ratio was 129:100, thus the first generation was almost 30 percent larger than the second; by the year 2030, this ratio will have shifted to 88:100. Great changes in the age structure, but also in the size of the population must be expected.

To appraise the effect of population policy measures thus requires a many-sided approach with very differing, interdisciplinary methodology. For the analysis presented here, one must conclude that the population policy of the GDR is achieving its set goals: The wish for children is being satisfied almost completely, the compatibility of motherhood/parenthood and career can be achieved without conflict, fertility is stable at a relatively high level. Replacement of the parent generation remains an objective to be attained only in the long term.

The facts presented here regarding the thinking and behavior pattern of young people, and the fertility of women describe fundamental characteristics of a demographic reproduction type which corresponds to the socioeconomic conditions at present existing in the GDR: the universality of the wish for children and motherhood or fatherhood, respectively, with simultaneous fulfillment of the totality of women's needs, whereby the number of children do not fully ensure replacement of the parent generation.

Current Tasks of Need-Oriented, Birth-Promoting Population Policy in the GDR

In the future, also, the population policy to influence fertility will remain an indispensable part of societal and social policy. The population production [sic] in the GDR as well as that in other countries requires it. The need development of young people poses ever new tasks in this area, also. During the last 10 years, it was possible to stabilize the wish for children and, all in all, it is being satisfied. But the tension between needs and value orientations on the one hand, and living conditions on the other, requires time and again the influence of population and other social policy measures. The focal point of population policy must continue to be the orientation that socialist society helps young people to create the preconditions for fulfilling their wish for children. It is in the interest of society as well as of young women and men that they fully satisfy their wish for children. In addition, socialist society will continue to aim at families

with two or three children since, in the interest of planned shaping of society, simple reproduction of the populace should not drop below a level of 80 percent.

Population reproduction belongs to the areas of political action where the achieved must be preserved and new developments must be recognized in good time.

Population policy—this results from the factors of reproductive behavior—must be many-sided. Ideas that population policy consists solely of measures to be promulgated by the state, are one-sided. But, when the ways of political action are concretely determined, it is also necessary to take into account how, according to the will of young people, the birth of children fits into their life cycle.

Traditionally, young women in the GDR give birth to their first child early on. Since the 1950s, the largest number of children are born when their mothers are between 21 and 24 years old. This birth peak has become steadily steeper to this day; i.e., ever fewer children are born to very young women, or to women over age 25. The first child is mostly born [to mothers] in her 22nd year of life, the majority of children (70 percent) by age 25. By age 30, the wish for children is essentially satisfied both for young women and young men. This also corresponds to their attitude, as borne out by the wish-for-children analysis 87: More than 70 percent wanted no more children after age 30, and 95 percent wanted no more after age 35. This "young birth peak" is linked to a number of population policy aspects:

—Very young people, when they become parents, as a rule have just started to establish a family, still have significant problems to solve in beginning their career development and creating living conditions for their family. At the birth of the first child, they often cannot adequately appraise the impending changes in their lives.

—A large part of very young mothers is single (does not have a live-in companion).

—Young women, whose wish for children varies, have different "timing" for the birth of their children in the course of their lives. It can be assumed that their living conditions do not differ basically.

In recent years, the number of women who give birth after age 30 has risen. But that changes little in the "young birth peak."

The analysis of the needs of young people shows that in the future, also, housing conditions are one of the pivotal points in using material means with the goal of attaining population policy effects. The wish-for-children analysis 87 established that over 50 percent of women to the age of 25 already have their own apartments. That is a very high degree of supply. But a large part of young people

considers the apartment too small and with inadequate living comfort. One must assume that their needs are rapidly increasing in this area, also.

The wish to have more time for their children is of ever greater importance to young parents. This results from the fact that children to a greater extent have become the center of the family. This has long been taken into account in social policy. Paid reduction in working hours, at first to 40 hours per week for all mothers with two or more children, among others, paid leave for one parent in case of a child's illness, even if the family has only one child, extension of vacation time, and granting of part-time work in accordance with Article 160 (4) of the Code of Labor Legislation (AGB), are important measures for the future. In the material measures mentioned here, families with three children continue to receive special attention. This holds true for state authorities, enterprises, and other societal institutions.

How such regulations influence the reproductive behavior of young people also depends on society's fondness for children being expressed in the demographic climate. It is also codetermined by how developed the relationship is between people in the second half of their working life, the third generation of the population, and the generation of young parents, the second generation. This holds true not only in the family, i.e., the relationship between adult children and their parents, but for generational relations in every area of life, and thus also concerns people of the third generation who have no children. It is of great significance for the demographic climate how the third generation judges the necessity of population policy services in favor of the second generation. Although population policy in the GDR in principle is also carried by the third generation, problems arise in enterprises and institutions because of shortened working hours, leave and other measures for young parents. Enterprises and institutions must solve great tasks in order to guarantee the social and population policy measures for whose granting they are responsible. It is very much to their credit that state managements and trade union organizations discharge these political and work-organizational tasks. It is true, however, that in recent years the needs and expectations of young people with regard to organizational services in this area have grown further. In the future, also, corresponding tasks will arise for enterprises and institutions.

The demographic climate also depends on enterprises and institutions expressly recognizing the performance of mothers and fathers, particularly of families with several children. This does not always find sufficient understanding in the third generation whose majority raised their children under more unfavorable living conditions than today's second generation. Such a material relationship between the third and the second generation exists at all times, in every population, and is always undergoing historic change. It is a valuable result of societal development that the second generation can

be given good possibilities for fulfilling its wish for children. It is a population policy task to achieve the necessary understanding in all social groups.

The ways of population policy mentioned so far have an indirect effect on young people's wish for children. But it is also necessary to influence it purposefully. In principle it holds true that needs and value orientations become firm in the phase of young age which is principally characterized by entry into the work life and the formation of stable partnership relations, that is, by attaining an independent social position. In preparing young people for marriage and family, in this phase it should be stressed that:

- A family based on love and respect is indispensable for the fulfillment of human life.
- The rearing of children is an important contribution to one's own personality development in that it gives specific meaning to life and is of great societal value.
- The education and care of children is fundamentally compatible with career and career development.
- One's own performances on behalf of society are the decisive precondition for high societal and social policy performances for the family.

In material population policy measures and in influencing the attitudes of adolescents and adults with regard to marriage, family, birth and education of children it is necessary to take into account the variety of growing patterns of thinking and behavior. Whoever attempts to rigidly impose orientations on an area as sensitive as birth occurrence will overlook that, on the one hand, the interests of the upcoming generation do not correspond in all ways to those of the present, determining generation and, on the other hand, that at the same time people also have very different wishes and interests.

For further population policy solutions, one must proceed on the premise of the steady increase of material and intellectual-cultural needs in the families. Value orientations which determine life with children are also increasingly dominated by the focal role played by the child in the family. This results in growing demands on material living conditions. As before, social and population policy can assume that stabilization or increase, respectively, of the fertility level can be attained if the totality of material and spiritual living conditions of the major social groups is changed. It is necessary, in accordance with the economic possibilities of socialist society, to supplement existing social policy measures with others in a continuous sequence.

Footnotes

1. "Programm der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands" [Program of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany], Dietz publishing company, East Berlin 1976, p 20.
2. Authors' Collective, "Lexikon der Sozialpolitik" [Lexicon of Social Policy], Verlag Die Wirtschaft, East Berlin 1987, p 347f.
3. Ibid., p 348.
4. On this concept, see Ch. Hoehn/H. Schubnell, "Bevoelkerungspolitische Massnahmen und ihre Wirksamkeit in ausgewaehlten europaeischen Industrielaendern (I)" [Population Policy Measures and Their Effectiveness in Selected European Industrial Countries (I)], ZEITSCHRIFT FUER BEVOELKERUNGSWISSENSCHAFT, Akademie-Verlag, East Berlin 1987, p 67f.
5. See detailed presentation on the triad of behavior factors in authors' collective, "Kind und Gesellschaft" [Child and Society], Akademie-Verlag, East Berlin 1987, p 67f.
6. See detailed presentation of decision determination in ibid., p 68ff.
7. Compare W. Speigner, "Vom Motiv zum Handeln" [From Motive to Action], Dietz Verlag, East Berlin 1980, p 35ff.
8. How this is done at present in the GDR cannot be elaborated here; see authors' collective "Sozialpolitik" [Social Policy], Verlag Die Wirtschaft, East Berrlin 1985, p 86ff.; "Politik zum Wohle des Volkes" (Dokumentation) [Policy for the Welfare of the People (documentation)], NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 19/20 March 1988.
9. See A. Klinger, "Demographische und andere Techniken zur Messung der Wirkung politischen Handelns auf Bevoelkerungsvorgaenge" [Demographic and other Techniques for Measuring the Effect of Political Action on Population Processes], Bielefeld 1986, unpublished.
10. See ibid.; D.J. van de Kaa, "Europe's Second Demographic Transition," POPULATION BULLETIN, No 42/1987, p 50; Ch. Hoehn/H. Schubnell, op. cit.
11. Kinderwunschanalyse 87 [Wish-for-Children Analysis 87].
12. See W. Speigner, "Die Generationen der Bevoelkerung und ihre Beziehungen unter demographischem Aspekt" [The Generations of the Populace from a Demographic Aspect], in "Jahrbuch fuer Soziologie und Sozialpolitik 1988" [Yearbook for Sociology and Social Policy 1988], Akademie-Verlag, East Berlin 1988, p 497ff.

This is a U.S. Government publication. Its contents in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government. Users of this publication may cite FBIS or JPRS provided they do so in a manner clearly identifying them as the secondary source.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) publications contain political, economic, military, and sociological news, commentary, and other information, as well as scientific and technical data and reports. All information has been obtained from foreign radio and television broadcasts, news agency transmissions, newspapers, books, and periodicals. Items generally are processed from the first or best available source; it should not be inferred that they have been disseminated only in the medium, in the language, or to the area indicated. Items from foreign language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed, with personal and place names rendered in accordance with FBIS transliteration style.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by FBIS/JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpts] in the first line of each item indicate how the information was processed from the original. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear from the original source but have been supplied as appropriate to the context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by the source. Passages in boldface or italics are as published.

SUBSCRIPTION/PROCUREMENT INFORMATION

The FBIS DAILY REPORT contains current news and information and is published Monday through Friday in eight volumes: China, East Europe, Soviet Union, East Asia, Near East & South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and West Europe. Supplements to the DAILY REPORTs may also be available periodically and will be distributed to regular DAILY REPORT subscribers. JPRS publications, which include approximately 50 regional, worldwide, and topical reports, generally contain less time-sensitive information and are published periodically.

Current DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are listed in *Government Reports Announcements* issued semimonthly by the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161 and the *Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications* issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

The public may subscribe to either hardcover or microfiche versions of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications through NTIS at the above address or by calling (703) 487-4630. Subscription rates will be

provided by NTIS upon request. Subscriptions are available outside the United States from NTIS or appointed foreign dealers. New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.

U.S. Government offices may obtain subscriptions to the DAILY REPORTs or JPRS publications (hardcover or microfiche) at no charge through their sponsoring organizations. For additional information or assistance, call FBIS, (202) 338-6735, or write to P.O. Box 2604, Washington, D.C. 20013. Department of Defense consumers are required to submit requests through appropriate command validation channels to DIA, RTS-2C, Washington, D.C. 20301. (Telephone: (202) 373-3771, Autovon: 243-3771.)

Back issues or single copies of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are not available. Both the DAILY REPORTs and the JPRS publications are on file for public reference at the Library of Congress and at many Federal Depository Libraries. Reference copies may also be seen at many public and university libraries throughout the United States.

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

12 APRIL 89